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 In 2014, the European Commission announced the launch of a study 
of knowledge transfer by public research organizations and other institutes 
of higher learning “to determine which additional measures might be 
needed to ensure an optimal flow of knowledge between the public research 
organisations and business thereby contributing to the development of the 
knowledge based economy.” As the European Commission has recognized, 
the European Union (“EU”) needs to take action to “unlock the potential 
of IPRs [intellectual property rights] that lie dormant in universities, 
research institutes and companies.” This article builds on our earlier work 
on structuring efficient pharmaceutical public-private partnerships 
(“PPPPs”), but focuses on the regulatory infrastructure necessary to 
support the efficient commercialization of publicly funded university 
medical research in both the European Union and the United States 
(“U.S.”). Our comparative analysis of the EU and U.S. approaches to 
translational medicine shows that there are lessons to be shared. The EU 
can apply the experiences from the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act and PPPPs in the 
United States, and the United States can emulate certain of the open 
innovation aspects of the European Innovative Medicines Initiative and the 
tighter patenting standards imposed by the European Patent Office. Thus, a 
secondary purpose of this article is suggesting amendments to the U.S. 
laws governing the patenting and licensing of government-funded 
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technology to prevent undue burdens on the sharing of certain upstream 
medical discoveries and research tools. 
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“[P]atent protection strikes a delicate balance between creating 
‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and ‘imped[ing] 
the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.’”1 
INTRODUCTION 
To improve industry competitiveness2 and address unmet health 
needs, government agencies in both the European Union (“EU”) and the 
United States (“U.S.”) are working with public universities and for-profit 
pharmaceutical firms “to foster translation [of medical discoveries] from 
the university to the healthcare sector through the generation and support of 
start-ups, spin-offs, university-industry consortia, and other platforms[.]”3 
The goal: facilitating the movement of discoveries from “bench to 
bedside.”4 
One example is the Precision Medicine Initiative (“PMI”), a $215 
million public-private project announced by President Obama in 2015, 
which presents “one of the greatest opportunities for new medical 
breakthroughs that we have ever seen.”5 Under the PMI, research 
 
 1.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 
(2012)). 
 2.  As EU Internal Market and Services Commissioner Michel Barnier put it: “It is my deeply 
held conviction there is no sustainable economic growth without innovation. And no innovation without 
efficient intellectual property protection[.]” Press Release, European Comm’n, European Patents Costs 
to Be Radically Reduced (Apr. 13, 2011), ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/press_releases/. . ./ 
pr1138_en.htm. 
 3.  Rogério Gaspar et al., Towards a European Strategy for Medicines Research (2014-2020): 
The EUFEPS Position Paper on Horizon 2020, 47 EUR. J. PHARMA. SCIS. 979, 980 (2012). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Precision Medicine (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/30/remarks-president-precision-medicine; Robert 
Pear, U.S. to Collect Genetic Data to Hone Care, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2015, at A12; Meg Tirrell & 
Cara Caruso, Obama Seeks $215 Million for Precision Medicine, CNBC (Jan. 30, 2015), 
www.cnbc.com/id/102382752. 
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universities, for-profit pharmaceutical firms, and others will collaborate to 
collect genetic, health, and environmental information from one million 
Americans in an effort to promote treatments tailored to individual 
patients.6 Britain launched a similar initiative—the Precision Medicine 
Catapult—in 2015.7 
In 2014, the European Commission launched a study of knowledge 
transfer by public research organizations and other institutions of higher 
learning8 “to determine which additional measures might be needed to 
ensure an optimal flow of knowledge between the public research 
organisations and business thereby contributing to the development of the 
knowledge based economy.”9 The study was designed to help implement 
Horizon 2020, a €80 billion program for research and innovation approved 
by the European Parliament and Council in December 2013.10 Regulators 
in the EU have already identified public-private and public-public 
partnerships as “key elements” of the “Innovation Union,” a feature of 
Horizon 2010.11 Slated to run from 2014 to 2020, the Innovation Union 
“aims to improve conditions and access to finance for research and 
innovation, to ensure that innovative ideas can be turned into products and 
services that create growth and jobs.”12 
But notwithstanding such initiatives to promote “academic 
entrepreneurship,”13 most university technology transfer offices are not 
 
 6.  Pear, supra note 5; Tirrell & Caruso, supra note 5. 
 7.   Kate Sweeney, Cambridge to Host Precision Medicine Catapult Network, BUS. WKLY. (July 
13, 2015), http://www.businessweekly.co.uk/news/biomedtech/cambridge-host-precision-medicine-
catapult-network. 
 8.  European Commission - State of the Innovation Union: Taking Stock 2010 – 2014, at 57, 
COM (2014) 339 [hereinafter EC Taking Stock 2014]. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  The European Commission described Horizon 2020 as “the biggest EU research and 
innovation framework programme ever launched, with over €80 billion dedicated to excellent research, 
industrial leadership and key societal challenges. It contributes to strengthening the knowledge base in 
Europe not only by funding research, but also by mainstreaming funding for activities in all stages of 
the innovation cycle, from frontier research to close-to-market innovation. It supports and encourages 
the participation of businesses, including SMEs [small and medium-sized enterprises]. In parallel, 
billions are being invested in innovation-driven public private partnerships.” Id. at 12. 
 11.  An Investment Plan for Europe, COM (2014) 903 final (Nov. 26, 2014). 
 12.  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative, 
Innovation Union, at 6, COM (2010) 546 final (Oct. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Europe 2020 Flagship 
Initiative]. 
 13.  Rosa Grimaldi et al., 30 Years After Bayh-Dole: Reassessing Academic Entrepreneurship, 40 
RES POL’Y 1045, 1045 (2011) (defining “academic entrepreneurship” as the “commercialization of 
innovations developed by academic scientists” through “patenting, licensing, start-up creation, and 
university-industry partnerships”). 
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profitable; the few that are generate an income stream that “is still a 
relatively small percentage of the total research volume.”14 For example, of 
the 734 licensing deals entered into by the University of California system 
between 1981 and 1999, only 188 resulted in positive royalty payments.15 
Similarly, between 1980 and 2004, only 358 of 2,270 inventions developed 
at the Max Planck Society16 yielded positive royalty income.17 In 2007, 
total licensing income represented just one percent of the Max Planck 
Society’s annual budget.18 The European Commission recognized the 
problem these statistics illustrate, stating: “We need to get more innovation 
out of our research. Cooperation between the worlds of science and the 
world of business must be enhanced, obstacles removed and incentives put 
in place.”19 Yet, as Guido Buenstorf and Matthias Geissler explain: 
 
Commercializing academic inventions is non-trivial because they are 
often far from being readily marketable. Prior work suggests that 
commercialization is complicated by uncertainty stemming from the 
early-stage character of most university inventions, information 
asymmetry between inventor and potential licensee, and also the non-
codified nature of important elements of the knowledge base underlying 
the traded technology.20 
 
For example, although researchers at universities have worked with 
for-profit pharmaceutical firms to commercialize discoveries flowing from 
the successful mapping of the human genome,21 barriers to 
commercialization remain. Extensive research in expensive facilities is 
 
 14.  Hester Tak & Bob Smailes, UniLink: A New Model for Increasing Academic and Industry 
Partnerships, 49 LES NOUVELLES 215, 218 (2014). 
 15.  Robert A. Lowe & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Overoptimism and the Performance of 
Entrepreneurial Firms, 52 MGMT. SCI. 173, 177 (2006). 
 16.  The Max Planck Society is “Germany’s largest non-university public research 
organization  . . . dedicated to basic science.” Guido Buenstorf & Matthias Geissler, Not Invented Here: 
Technology Licensing, Knowledge Transfer and Innovation Based on Public Research, 22 J. 
EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 481, 482 (2012). 
 17.  Id. at 496. 
 18.  Id. at 495. 
 19.  Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative, supra note 12, at 3. 
 20.  Buenstorf & Geissler, supra note 16, at 482. 
 21.  Robert I. Field, How the Government Created and Sustains the Private Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 11, 28 (2012). The U.S. Government spent $3.8 billion 
mapping the complete set of human genes. Id. at 30. To encourage private scientists to participate in the 
project, the government put its findings in a public database within twenty-four hours of discovery, with 
no limitations on their use. Id. at 28. 
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required to convert the findings of pharmacogeneticists22 into a treatment 
regime. A pharmaceutical company may spend an estimated $5 billion 
bringing a new drug to market, a figure that includes the cost of 
unsuccessful drug candidates.23 While pharmacogenomic products offer 
“personalized medicine,” a benefit to the patient receiving the drug, 
pharmaceutical companies lack incentive to develop pharmacogenomic 
products because of (1) small sample sizes in clinical trials, which can 
increase the cost of the already expensive new drug approval process by 
requiring extra trials and research;24 (2) lack of coverage by Medicare and 
private insurers for the companion genetic tests;25 and (3) concern about 
limiting the pool of people who will receive their drug.26 
Another costly area is microbiotics, the study of the microbial cells in 
the human body. Microbial cells outnumber human cells roughly ten to one 
and are thought to interact with the human host to support health or trigger 
disease.27 Scientists are now applying many of the tools developed for 
pharmacogenetics to study the human microbiome, the genes of the several 
 
 22.  Pharmacogenetics is the study of genetic traits that “might underlie variation among 
individuals in drug response, based on individual differences in enzyme structure and function.” Valerie 
Gutmann Koch, Incentivizing the Utilization of Pharmacogenomics in Drug Development, 15 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 263, 264 (2012). Its focus is the reaction of genetically diverse patients to a 
specific, often preexisting, medication: “one drug across many genomes.” Id. at 265. As such, it is at the 
drug discovery stage where pharmacogenomics “exert[s] its impact”; this impact will be present in 
products “over the long term.” Id. Only 1 out of 60,000 compounds created by drug companies are 
highly successful; roughly 1 out of 6 drugs put into clinical trials are ultimately approved by the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA); and more than 3% of drugs approved by the FDA were 
subsequently withdrawn between 1971 and 2006 due to negative side effects. Id. at 274 n.89, 276. 
Pharmacogenomics includes not only pharmacogenetics but also research conducted during the earlier 
stages in a drug’s development to determine “which compounds will be most effective for a particular 
genome (‘many drugs across one genome’).” Id. at 264. 
 23.  David C. Babaian, Adopting Pharmacogenomics and Parenting Repurposed Molecules Under 
the Orphan Drug Act: A Cost Dilemma, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 667, 673–74 (2014). 
Small biotech firms have entered into agreements with large pharmaceutical firms to develop 
pharmacogenetic test kits and innovations. Koch, supra note 22, at 279. They include a $200 million 
agreement between Roche and deCODE Genetics “to identify disease genes through genetic analysis of 
the uniquely homogenous Icelandic population.” Id. at 280 (quoting Allen C. Nunnally et al., 
Intellectual Property and Commercial Aspects of Pharmacogenomics, in PHARMACOGENOMICS: 
SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 109, 127–28 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2003)). 
 24.  Sarah Blankstein, Pharmacogenomics: History, Barriers, and Regulatory Solutions, 69 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 273, 273–75 (2014). 
 25.  Id. at 275. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Michael Pollan, Some of My Best Friends Are Germs, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 15, 2013, at 
MM36. A healthy human has more than 100 trillion bacteria. Id. The collective genome of a microbial 
community “is estimated to be 100- to 1000-fold that of human cells, which comprise 23,000 genes.” 
Linda C. Duffy et al., Progress and Challenges in Developing Metabolic Footprints from Diet in 
Human Gut Microbial Cometabolism, J. NUTRITION, Apr. 1, 2015, 1S, 1S, http://jn.nutrition.org/ 
content/early/2015/04/01/jn.114.194936. 
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hundred microbial species in the human body.28 Many scientists believe 
that this “second genome” can affect one’s health more than one’s inherited 
genes, and that it may be possible to “reshape” or “cultivate” microbiota.29 
Developments in metagenomics have already made it possible to examine 
the ways the microbiome and human host interact without having to 
cultivate bacterial strains in the laboratory.30 
Microbiotics offers possible treatments for certain autoimmune 
diseases and other ailments.31 Scientist Jeff Gordon predicts that disorders 
of the microbiome will eventually be treated with “synbiotics,” next-
generation probiotic microbes that patients will take with prebiotic 
nutrients, as well as with new “therapeutic foods” that will heal various 
intestinal issues.32 Both Big Pharma and Big Food will likely have a large 
stake in “repairing the microbiota of people who can’t or don’t care to 
simply change their diets.”33 Because of their extensive research re-
quirements, macrobiotics and metagenomics as well as pharmacogenetics 
are important areas for public-private cooperation. 
To promote research in this area, the U.S. National Institutes of Health 
(“NIH”) created the five-year Common Fund Human Microbiome Project 
(“HMP”) in 2007, allocating $217 million to fund research on human 
microbiota and to develop “metagenomics datasets and computational tools 
for characterizing the microbiome in healthy adults and in cohorts of 
specific microbiome-associated diseases.”34 A second phase of HMP began 
in 2013, was funded with $15 million from the NIH Common Fund, and 
will focus on the microbiome and its role in pregnancy and birth, diabetes, 
 
 28.  Pollan, supra note 27. The term “microbiota” refers to all the microbes in a community, and 
the term “microbiome” refers to their collective genes. Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  The NIH explained: “Advances in DNA sequencing technologies have created a new field of 
research, called metagenomics, allowing comprehensive examination of microbial communities without 
the need for cultivation [in a laboratory]. Instead of examining the genomes of individual bacterial 
strains that have been grown in the laboratory and then trying to reassemble the community of 
microbes, the metagenomic approach allows analysis of genetic material harvested directly from 
microbial communities without the need to culture the microbes. In the HMP, this approach is 
complementing genetic analyses of available reference strains, providing unprecedented information 
about the complexity of human-associated microbial communities. Other  advanced ‘omics technologies 
like transcriptomics, proteomics and metabolomics, which measure the biological properties of whole 
microbial communities, are being used to provide insights into how the microbiome and human host 
interact to support health or to trigger disease.” Human Microbiome Project: Overview, NAT’L INST. OF 
HEALTH, http://commonfund.nih.gov/hmp/overview (last updated Sept. 24, 2014). 
 31.  Pollan, supra note 27. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Human Microbiome Project: Overview, supra note 30. 
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and inflammatory bowel disease.35 Another endeavor, the American Gut 
Project, is an open-source project involving researchers across the globe 
that seeks the participation of tens of thousands of “citizen scientists” to 
provide specimens for study.36 The project hopes to sequence the 
microbiome of the participants and to “uncover patterns of correlation 
between people’s lifestyle, diet, health status and the makeup of their 
microbial community.”37 
Patents and exclusive licenses of patented technology are the primary 
legal tools used to recoup a firm’s investment in the commercialization of a 
new pharmaceutical compound, biologic, synbiotic, or genetically 
engineered therapeutic food.38 Although patents spur investment, they also 
 
 35.  Id.; Steven Benowitz, Human Microbiome Meeting Highlights Research Progress in a Field 
Already Beginning to Matter, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., https://www.genome.gov/ 
27554771 (last updated Aug. 20, 2014). In 2014, the NIH invited applications for a $1 million grant 
designed to study gut-microbiome-brain interactions. Part 1. Overview Information, DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-MH-15-850.html (last visited Sept. 
1, 2015). 
 36.  American Gut, SCI. AM., http://www.scientificamerican.com/citizen-science/american-gut/ 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2014). The American Gut Project initially raised roughly $350,000 through the 
crowd-sourcing portal Indiegogo. Jessica Marshall, Kickstart Your Research, 110 PNAS 4857, 4857–
59, http://www.pnas.org/content/110/13/4857.full. 
 37.  American Gut, supra note 36. 
 38.  See generally Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (holding that a farmer may 
not reproduce genetically modified soybean seeds patented by Monsanto by replanting and then 
harvesting more seeds than he had originally purchased without the permission of the patent holder). 
Pharmaceutical companies must be wary of “product hopping” when promoting new versions of 
existing drugs that are reaching the end of their patent life, as it may be considered unlawful 
monopolization triggering antitrust enforcement. Second Circuit Rules that “Product Hopping” May 
Constitute Unlawful Monopolization; Pharmaceutical Companies are Likely Targets of Future Antitrust 
Enforcement, COOLEY LLP (June 12, 2015), http://www.cooley.com/71569?MailKey=9374288. In New 
York v. Actavis PLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined “a novel question of 
antitrust law: under what circumstances does conduct by a monopolist to perpetuate patent exclusivity 
through successive products, commonly known as ‘product hopping,’ violate the Sherman Act.” 787 
F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2015). New York State had alleged that as the patent exclusivity period neared 
for Actavis’ twice-daily Alzheimer’s drug Namenda IR, Actavis introduced a new, once-daily version 
of the drug called Namenda XR. The patents on XR ensured exclusivity and prohibited generic versions 
until 2029. Because of potential competition from the forthcoming generic version of IR, Actavis 
withdrew “virtually all” IR from the market, forcing Alzheimer’s patients who used IR to switch to XR 
before the generic versions of IR became available. New York alleged that such a “forced-switch 
scheme” would likely impede generic competition for IR, and that the high costs of switching from the 
once-daily XR back to twice-daily IR use would likely further ensure that Actavis maintained its 
effective monopoly in the relevant drug market beyond the time granted by the IR patents. The Second 
Circuit held that withdrawing the twice-daily version was a violation of the Sherman Act, affirming the 
district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction that barred Actavis from restricting access to the twice-
daily IR version and from charging more for it than when XR was first introduced. Id. at 663. This is 
just one example of what can be the complex interplay between the legitimate use of the exclusivity 
provided by patents and the unlawful monopolization prohibited by the antitrust laws. 
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reduce competition, leading to higher prices.39 And they can impede further 
innovation. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.: “[P]atent protection strikes a delicate 
balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and 
discovery’ and ‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, 
indeed spur, invention.’”40 These are not only hotly contested contractual 
issues,41 but matters of social and governmental import. Accordingly, 
“[p]olicy-makers must . . . determine, through the patent system, how to 
balance the promotion of downstream pharmacogenomic [and other 
pharmaceutical] research while protecting the rights of innovators.”42 
The purpose of this article is to advance the public policy and 
academic debate in both the EU and the United States concerning the 
intellectual property issues inherent in drug development collaboration 
among government, academia, and private industry—what has been 
dubbed the “triple helix.”43 We propose solutions that build on aspects of 
both the European Innovation in Medicines Initiative (“IMI”) and the 
Bayh-Dole Act,44 the U.S. statute governing the patenting and licensing of 
government-funded university technology. We also extend the game theory 
analysis of public-private partnerships we presented in an earlier article45 to 
include the incentives necessary to persuade academic researchers to share 
their tacit knowledge with the commercial partner in a PPPP. 
Part I briefly describes global trends in pharmaceutical research, 
development, and commercialization before outlining the role pharma-
ceutical public-private partnerships can play in this process. Parts II and III 
 
 39.  For example, Myriad Genetics was able to charge $3,000 for a test for the two breast cancer 
genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 because it had patents on those gene sequences, while a university lab can 
sequence 20,000 genes for less than $500. Although the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Myriad’s 
patent on isolated gene sequences because they are naturally occurring substances, it upheld the patent 
on cDNA, the synthetic complementary DNA used to develop tests for specific genetic markers. Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 (2013). 
 40.  Id. at 2116 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1305 (2012)). 
 41.  See, e.g., Suzanne Majewski & Dean V. Williamson, Incomplete Contracting and the 
Structure of R&D Joint Venture Contracts, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 201 
(Gary D. Libecap ed., 2004) (stressing importance of allocating property rights in R&D ventures ex 
ante by contract). 
 42.  Koch, supra note 22, at 302. 
 43.  See generally Loet Leydesdorff, The Triple Helix: An Evolutionary Model of Innovations, 29 
RES. POL’Y 243 (2000) (explaining that universities can play as critical a role as government and 
industry in knowledge-based societies). 
 44.  Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 200–212 (2012)). 
 45.  See generally Constance E. Bagley & Christina D. Tvarnø, Pharmaceutical Public-Private 
Partnerships: Moving from the Bench to the Bedside, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 373 (2014). 
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discuss the EU IMI and three U.S. NIH translational medicine initiatives. 
Part IV discusses technology transfer from academia to industry, including 
the ownership of inventions, licensing and patent considerations, the role of 
university technology transfer offices, and recent changes to the EU patent 
regime. Part V presents public policy concerns raised by university 
licensing to private firms. Finally, Part VI concludes by proposing an 
intellectual property regime for the EU designed to promote the 
commercialization of technology developed in university laboratories with 
government funds without jeopardizing either the historic role of 
universities in Europe or the goals of the common market reflected in the 
restrictions on state aid. 
I. THE GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN 
The existing productivity challenge in the pharmaceutical industry is a 
result of increasing research and development (“R&D”) costs, decreasing 
production, a lack of administrative approval of new products, reduced 
public funding, and empty or exhausted pipelines.46 In 2012, the “year of 
all patent-cliff years,” the patents on AstraZeneca’s Seroquel IR, Bristol-
Myers Squibb’s Plavix, and Merck’s Singulair all expired.47 Pfizer’s patent 
on Lipitor had expired in late 2011.48 Table 1 reflects the resulting financial 
pressure on pharmaceutical companies around the world.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46.  See, e.g., MARTIN GRUEBER & TIM STUDT, BATTELLE, 2014 GLOBAL R&D FUNDING 
FORECAST 22 (2013), http://www.battelle.org/docs/tpp/2014_global_rd_funding_forecast.pdf (noting 
that “pressures persist to improve on productivity, product pipelines and ROI in consideration of 
expiring patents, cost pressures and the rising complexity of innovation in drug development” and that 
when traditional pharmaceutical companies “struggle with reduced product pipelines and productivity 
from discovery through development . . . R&D spending often declines”); Sam Stein, Ebola Vaccine 
Would Likely Have Been Found by Now if Not for Budget Cuts: NIH Director, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 
12, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/12/ebola-vaccine_n_5974148.html (Dr. Francis 
Collins, the director of the National Institutes of Health, explained that the organization had gone 
through a “10-year slide in research support” and that the institute’s “purchasing power is down 23 
percent from what it was a decade ago.”). 
 47.  Top Pharma Companies by 2012 Revenues, FIERCEPHARMA (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www. 
fiercepharma.com/special-reports/top-pharma-companies-2012-revenues. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See generally Tom. R. Denee et al., Measuring the Value of Public-Private Partnerships in 
the Pharmaceutical Sciences, 11 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 419 (2012). 
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Table 1: The Top Fifteen Pharmaceutical Companies by 2013 and 
2012 Revenues 
 
Company Head-
quarters 
2013 
Rank 
2013 
Revenues 
(U.S. $b) 
2012 
Rank  
2012 
Revenues 
(U.S. $b) 
Pfizer U.S. 1 47.88 1 51.21 
Novartis EU 2 47.47 2 46.73 
Roche EU 3 39.16 5 38.01 
Merck & Co. U.S. 4 37.44 3 40.60 
Sanofi EU 5 37.12 4 39.51 
GlaxoSmithKline EU 6 33.33 6 33.34 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
U.S. 7 28.13 8 25.35 
AstraZeneca U.S. 8 25.71 7 27.93 
Lilly EU 9 20.96 9 20.57 
AbbVie U.S. 10 18.79 11 18.38 
Teva Israel 11 18.31 10 18.54 
Amgen U.S. 12 18.19 14 16.64 
Takeda Japan 13 17.41 13 17.56 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
U.S. 14 16.39 12 17.62 
Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
U.S. 15 15.79 15 14.66 
Source: Top 25 Pharma Companies by Global Sales, PMLIVE, http://www.pm 
live.com/top_pharma_ list/global_revenues (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
 
Research published in 2015 in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association found that while “[m]edical research in the United States 
remains the primary source of new discoveries, drugs, devices, and clinical 
procedures for the world . . . the U.S. lead in these categories is 
declining.”50 In 2011, for instance, the United States’ share of total medical 
research spending (both academic and commercial) had decreased to forty-
four percent, while Europe—the second largest sponsor—maintained a 
thirty-three percent share.51 Between 2000 and 2009, the number of 
biomedical research articles published by U.S. scientists increased by only 
 
 50.  Hamilton Moses III et al., The Anatomy of Medical Research: US and International 
Comparisons, 313(2) J. AM. MED. ASS’N 174, 181 (2015). 
 51.  Id. at 179. In 2004, the United States funded fifty-seven percent of global medical research. 
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0.6% annually. In contrast, the number of articles published by Chinese 
scientists during that same period increased by more than 18% annually.52 
Similarly, while the U.S. share of global government and industry 
funding for medical research has decreased in recent years, spending has 
markedly increased in Asia, especially in China, India, Japan, Singapore, 
and South Korea.53 Since 2004, the U.S. share of industry funding has 
dropped from nearly 50% to 41%,54 and, during that same period, Japan has 
increased its share of industry funding by 3.9%.55 In 2011, China filed 30% 
of global life sciences patents, up from just 1% in 1991. But the United 
States’ share grew comparatively slowly, increasing from 11% to 24% in 
that time.56 Additionally, between 1991 and 2011,  the percentage of 
“highly valuable patents,” measured by subsequent citation counts, 
decreased for patents issued to U.S. inventors by the U.S. and European 
patent offices.57 
Between 2003 and 2013, the European Medicines Agency (“EMA”) 
received on average more drug applications (fifty-five per year) and 
approved more drugs (forty-two per year) than the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”), which averaged twenty-six approvals per year in 
the same period.58 In 2013 alone, the EMA received twenty-two more 
applications and approved sixteen more drugs than the FDA, suggesting 
that, at least in terms of number of new drugs approved for use, Europe is 
continuing to outpace the United States.59 A study involving patenting by 
492 tenured engineering academics working in the United Kingdom 
between 1996 and 2007 showed that “UK researchers receiving funding 
from industry are more likely to produce patents, controlling for a variety 
of individual and departmental characteristics,”60 than UK researchers not 
 
 52.  Id. at 181. 
 53.  Id. at 178–79. 
 54.  Id. at 179. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 180. 
 57.  Id. China’s percentage of highly valuable patents increased between 1991 and 2011. See id. at 
184. 
 58.  Id. at 181. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Cornelia Lawson, Academic Patenting: The Importance of Industry Support, 38 J. TECH. 
TRANSFER 509, 510 (2013). Even small industry grants, “which may support [knowledge] 
dissemination activities, studentships and consulting,” and indicate close links between the industrial 
sponsor and the academic researchers, positively affect patenting. Id. at 510, 518. Researchers also 
found a strong positive correlation between industry collaboration and funding and patenting by 
Norwegian academics, and a positive correlation between industry sponsorship of German science and 
engineering departments and patent citations. Id. at 512 (citing M. Gulbrandsen & J.C. Smeby, Industry 
Funding and University Professors’ Research Performance, 34(6) RESEARCH POL’Y 932 (2005), and H. 
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receiving industry funding, suggesting the important role industry can play 
in academic entrepreneurship. 
The reduction in the U.S. government share of spending on medical 
research may be one reason why private firms have, since 2003, 
increasingly focused on later-stage clinical trials and product development, 
reducing their “discovery-level investment” in activities such as target 
identification and validity.61 This shift has widened the “so-called ‘valley 
of death,’” which separates “upstream research on promising genes, 
proteins, and biological pathways” by government-funded academic 
researchers from “downstream drug candidates”62 outside firms fund in 
hopes of commercializing the researchers’ discoveries.63 This gap is 
particularly difficult to bridge given not only the cost of commercializing a 
compound, biologic, or symbiotic, but also the inherent tension between the 
goals of academia and the commercial sector. Whereas universities (a term 
we use to include research institutes) focus primarily on the public 
dissemination of new knowledge and discoveries, the private sector is often 
more concerned with capturing the revenues available to the patent-holding 
firm or an exclusive licensee. 
As we explain in our article “Pharmaceutical Public-Private 
Partnerships: Moving from the Bench to the Bedside,”64 a properly 
structured pharmaceutical public-private partnership (“PPPP”)65 can help 
bridge the “valley of death.” Used more commonly in the United States 
than in Europe, a PPPP is an arrangement between a university (whether 
governmentally or privately funded) and one or more private 
pharmaceutical firms to develop new medicines that can be sold by the 
firms for a profit.66 
 
Hottenrott & S. Thorwarth, Industry Funding of University Research and Scientific Productivity, 64(4) 
KYKLOS 534 (2011)). U.K. academic inventors who had filed a patent application while working in 
industry, and before becoming an academic, produced patents of higher quality, as measured by the 
number of forward citations, than patenting academics who had never worked in industry. Id. at 517. 
 61.  Moses III et al., supra note 50, at 181–82. 
 62.  Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property 
Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 4 (2008). 
 63.  See also Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative, supra note 12. 
 64.  Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 45. 
 65.  Notwithstanding the word “partnership,” public-private partnerships “are defined and bound 
by contracts; they are no more and no less than the documents negotiated, approved, and executed.” 
Julia Paschal Davis, Public-Private Partnerships, 44 PROCUREMENT L. 9, 9 (Fall 2008). 
 66.  See Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative, supra note 12, at 14 (indicating the European 
Commission’s position that “[c]losing these gaps, and making Europe an attractive place to invest in 
innovation, requires the intelligent use of public private partnerships as well as changes to the 
regulatory framework.”). 
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The parties in a PPPP must combine long-form contracting, relational 
governance, properly aligned incentives, and transparency to move from 
the Nash prisoners’ dilemma equilibrium to the Pareto Optimal Frontier, 
that is, to create joint utility that gives each party more utility than it would 
have been able to generate acting alone.67 This is depicted in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: An Efficient PPPP 
 
Source: Constance E. Bagley & Christina D. Tvarnø, Pharmaceutical Public-
Private Partnerships: Moving from the Bench to the Bedside, 4 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 389 (2014). 
 
 67.  Bagley & Tvarnø, supra note 45, at 386–87. 
  Accept and 
Abide by 
Contract and 
Abide by 
Relational 
Norms 
Reject 
Contract but 
Abide by 
Relational 
Norms 
Accept 
Contract but 
Deviate from 
Relational 
Norms 
Reject 
Contract and 
Deviate 
from 
Relational 
Norms 
Breach 
Contract 
Accept and 
Abide by 
Contract and 
Abide by 
Relational 
Norms 
5, 5     
Reject Contract 
but Abide by 
Relational 
Norms 
 2, 2    
Accept Contract 
but Deviate 
from Relational 
Norms 
  3, 3   
Reject Contract 
and Deviate 
from Relational 
Norms 
   -2, -2  
Breach Contract  -2, 4    4, -2 
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 As explained in our earlier article: 
 
If both parties agree to a well-drafted binding contract and abide by 
relational norms, then they both have a positive utility of 5. These 
payoffs are arbitrary numbers whose importance is their relative value 
and sign. If the parties cannot agree on a contract but abide by relational 
norms then the joint utility (2, 2) would still be positive, that is, greater 
than it would be if there was no cooperation at all but lower than what 
would result for a binding contract supplemented by relational 
governance (5, 5). The same is true if there is a contract but relational 
norms are violated (3, 3). Given the critical importance of allocating 
intellectual property rights by contract, we are assuming that the joint 
utility is less in this situation, though that may not always be the case. If, 
however, a party breaches the contract, unless the other party waives its 
contract rights, this opportunistic behavior results in a loss to the non-
breaching party (say, -2), which may be compensable at least in part by 
damages, and ill-gotten gain by the breaching party (say, 4).68 
 
But that is not enough to convert the “dead capital”69 created in 
university laboratories by academic researchers into commercially viable 
products. Success requires three additional elements: (1) crafting an 
intellectual property regime that facilitates both new upstream discoveries 
and the development of tools of broad application by academic researchers; 
(2) giving the pharmaceutical firms funding commercialization the robust 
returns necessary to justify the expense of developing and testing multiple 
compounds and biologics, knowing that only about fifteen percent will ever 
move past clinical trials to governmental approval;70 and (3) offering  
university researchers adequate incentives to justify their participation in 
the commercialization process. 
II. THE EU INNOVATIVE MEDICINES INITIATIVE AND THE 
ACTION PLAN AGAINST THE RISING THREATS FROM 
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE 
The European Union (“EU”) has enacted a variety of initiatives to 
facilitate the flow of discoveries from the bench to the bedside, including 
 
 68.  Id. at 386–89 (discussing further how to avoid the inefficient Nash equilibrium in the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma). 
 69.  HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST 
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 47–48 (2000) (explaining how defined property rights make it possible 
to convert “dead capital” into an asset that can be sold, shared or hypothecated). 
 70.  See Koch, supra note 22, at 274 n.89 (“Only about one in six drug candidates that enter 
clinical trials are ultimately submitted to and approved by the FDA, according to a study of the 50 
largest companies.” (quoting PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., 2011 PROFILE 10 (2011))). 
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the Innovative Medicines Initiative (“IMI”) and the Action Plan Against 
the Rising Threats from Antimicrobial Resistance. As Màire Geoghegan-
Quinn, then-EU Commissioner of Research, Innovation and Science 
explained, the “Innovation Union” contemplated by Horizon 2020 requires 
“(i) excellent science, (ii) industrial leadership and (iii) [the ability to 
address] societal challenges.”71 
A.  Goals and Structure of the Innovative Medicines Initiative 
The IMI is Europe’s largest public-private pharmaceutical 
development partnership. It is designed to provide socio-economic benefits 
to European citizens by (1) improving drug development, thereby 
generating faster access to better medicines, and (2) increasing investment 
in the European pharmaceutical R&D industry, thereby establishing Europe 
as the most attractive place for pharmaceutical R&D.72 The public party is 
the EU, represented by the European Commission (“EC”). The private 
party is the pharmaceutical industry, represented by the European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (“EFPIA”) and 
its members. Among other projects, the IMI supports the European Lead 
Factory public-private partnership, an international consortium comprising 
thirty partners that have agreed to pool 500,000 chemical compounds; 
300,000 compounds came from AstraZeneca, Bayer Pharma, Merck, 
Sanofi and three other member companies, and the balance will come from 
academia and smaller firms.73 
Each IMI calls for a project proposal involves open competition for 
funding as well as multiple stakeholders, including EFPIA, private 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology enterprises ranging from large to small, 
 
 71.  See Farewell Message—Commissioner Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Oct. 
2014), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/geoghegan-quinn/headlines/news/2014/20140930-
farewell_en.htm; What is Horizon 2020, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/ 
horizon2020/en/what-horizon-2020 (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). Carlos Moedas became the EU 
commissioner for Research, Science and Innovation on November 1, 2014. See Carlos Moedas, 
EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/moedas_en (last visited Nov. 19, 
2014). As such, he is responsible for overseeing the EU research funding programs and Horizon 2020’s 
contribution to the Commission’s jobs, growth and investment package through the promotion of the 
international excellence of the EU’s research and science and the strengthening of research capacities 
and innovation across all Member States. See id. 
 72.   Hugh Laverty, Boosting Drug Development Through Public-Private Partnerships – The IMI 
Model, 5 EPMA J., Feb. 2014, at A11, http://www.epmajournal.com/content/pdf/1878-5085-5-S1-
A11.pdf. 
 73.  Ben Hirschler, Drugmakers, Academics Pool R&D in $265 Mln EU Project, REUTERS (Feb. 
7, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/07/pharmaceuticals-europe-rd-idUSL5N0B65QD201 
30207; European Lead Factory: An Open Innovation Experiment in Drug Discovery, SLAS 
ELECTRONIC LABORATORY NEIGHBORHOOD (May 28, 2013), http://eln.slas.org/story/1/98-european-
lead-factory-an-open-innovation-experiment-in-drug-discovery. 
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universities, hospitals, patient organizations, and public authorities. Thus, 
universities and firms bid for government and industry funds to support 
research in areas of high medical need.  All IMI contracts are subject to EU 
regulations, including those pertaining to the ownership of any resulting 
discoveries and the State aid rules, which are both discussed in Part VI. 
The European Union committed to contribute €1 billion to the first 
phase of the IMI research program (“IMI 1”), which will be matched by 
private in-kind contributions of at least €1 billion from the EFPIA member 
companies and their affiliates.74 The public funding is directed primarily to 
academic and non-profit institutions. As of November 2014, forty-seven 
IMI 1 projects were underway with a combined budget of €2 billion.75 
Phase two of the Innovative Medicines Initiative (“IMI 2”) 
commenced in July 2014 and is slated to run for ten years.76 Building on 
the successes and lessons learned during IMI 1, IMI 2 seeks to develop 
next generation vaccines, medicines, and treatments, such as new 
antibiotics.77 IMI 2 has a total budget of €3.276 billion, of which the EU 
will contribute up to €1.638 billion from the funds authorized for Horizon 
2020.78 EFPIA has committed to provide €1.425 billion through in-kind 
contributions,79 and other life science industries may contribute an 
additional €213 million, either as partners in individual projects or as IMI 2 
members.80 
 
 74.  The IMI Joint Undertaking Model Grant Agreement Annex II - General Conditions defines 
“in-kind” as “contributions to the project by European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations (EFPIA) companies and their affiliated entities, with resources such as personnel, 
equipment, consumables, declared in accordance with Articles II.4, II.13 and II.14.” INNOVATIVE 
MEDICINES INITIATIVE, IMI JOINT UNDERTAKING MODEL GRANT AGREEMENT ANNEX II – GENERAL 
CONDITIONS  2 (2012) (on file with authors); see INNOVATIVE MEDS. INITIATIVE, CONNECTING PEOPLE, 
SHARING KNOW-HOW, SPEEDING UP HEALTH RESEARCH: JOIN THE PARTNERSHIP 3 (2013), 
http://www.imi.europa.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/IMI%20Brochure-Dec2013-Web-
Spread.pdf. 
 75.  See Anti-Biopharmaceutical Immunization: Prediction and Analysis of Clinical Relevance to 
Minimize the Risk, IMI ONGOING PROJECTS, http://www.imi.europa.eu/content/ongoing-projects (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2014); Introducing IMI, INNOVATIVE MEDS. INITIATIVE [IMI], http:// 
www.imi.europa.eu/content/mission (last visited Dec. 12, 2014) (“IMI was launched in 2008 and 
currently has over 50 projects, with more in the pipeline.”). 
 76.  IMI - The Story so Far, IMI, http://www.imi.europa.eu/content/history (last visited Aug. 24, 
2015). 
 77.  IMI 2, IMI, http://www.imi.europa.eu/content/imi-2#Budget (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
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B.  Ownership of IMI-Funded Inventions 
Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No. 1290/2013 provides that the results 
of an IMI-funded research project are owned by the participant that 
generated them. If, however, the participants make joint contributions to 
the final result that cannot be differentiated, then the participants will 
jointly own the results.81 Similarly, if it is not possible to separate the 
jointly-owned results for the purpose of applying for, obtaining, or 
maintaining the relevant intellectual property rights protection, then the 
participants will jointly own the intellectual property rights.82 Article 41 
requires joint owners to enter into an agreement regarding the allocation of 
rights and the terms governing the exercise of their joint ownership in 
accordance with their obligations under the grant agreement.83 The joint 
owners may elect not to continue to hold the rights jointly. They may, 
instead, enter into an alternative contractual arrangement by, for example, 
transferring their ownership shares to a single owner who agrees to grant 
access rights to the other participants once the results are available.84 
In contrast with the multi-participant IMI framework, the Pfizer 
Centers for Therapeutic Innovation85 and other comparable PPPPs in the 
United States involve a single private pharmaceutical firm that solicits 
proposals from academic scientists for research to be funded by the private 
firm. The private firm forms an assessment committee that evaluates the 
proposals with the goal of developing the firm’s business without the 
involvement or intervention of competitors or pharmaceutical industry 
trade associations. Often, the pharmaceutical firm becomes the sole owner 
of the pharmaceutical patent through an assignment of inventions or, if the 
patent belongs to the researcher or the university, the firm becomes the 
exclusive licensee of the invention. 
C. Action Plan Against the Rising Threats from Antimicrobial Resistance 
In 2011, the European Commission launched another type of 
pharmaceutical development initiative called the Action Plan Against the 
Rising Threats from Antimicrobial Resistance. In response, AstraZeneca 
and GlaxoSmithKline announced that they would jointly contribute a total 
 
 81.  See Regulation, 1290/2013 of Dec. 11, 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 347) 81 (EU). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  See id. 
 85.  Centers for Therapeutic Innovation, PFIZER, http://www.pfizer.com/research/rd_partnering/ 
centers_for_therapeutic_innovation (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
 2015 PROMOTING “ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP” 19 
of €224 million to develop new antibiotics.86 Both firms agreed to share 
information and to contribute compounds to the venture. This private joint 
venture involving two direct competitors collaborating to meet the public 
demand for new antibiotics offers a possible model for the horizontal 
private-private pooling of resources.87 
III. THE U.S. NATIONAL CENTER FOR ADVANCING 
TRANSLATIONAL SCIENCES AND OTHER U.S. PROGRAMS 
Like the European Union, the United States has created several 
vehicles to promote translational medicine. The National Institutes of 
Health in the United States established the National Center for Advancing 
Translational Sciences (“NCATS”) in 2011, which for fiscal year 2015 had 
a budget request of $657 million.88 The NCATS Strategic Alliances Office 
is designed “to make it easy for industry and academia to interact and 
partner with NCATS laboratories and scientists” by, among other things, 
“negotiating standard forms and model agreements between NCATS and 
outside parties, including universities, pharmaceutical companies and 
biotechnology companies” in the United States.89 According to the 
European Federation for Pharmaceutical Sciences (EUFEPS), which 
“represent[s] the interests of scientists in industry, academia, government 
and other institutions engaged in drug research, development, regulation 
and policymaking through Europe,”90 Europe will need to pursue similar 
 
 86.  Amy Ritter, Public-Private Partnerships Step Up, PHARMTECH TALK (May 30, 2012), 
http://blog.pharmtech.com/2012/05/30/public-private-partnerships-step-up/. 
 87.  Rai et al., supra note 62, at 5. Rai and her coauthors propose a two-step arrangement whereby 
direct competitors could put their proprietary and secret small molecules into a pool, managed by a 
trusted intermediary, where they would be tested in secret via high-throughput screening against assays 
contributed by academic researchers. If the screening revealed a “hit,” that is, “molecules that showed 
significant activity against the target in question [that] could lead to new drug candidates,” then “the 
contributing firm would have an obligation to provide relevant structural information to the academic 
via the intermediary.” Id. at 22. Similarly, the academic participant would be required to disclose to the 
firm that owned the molecule “a general statement of the methodology used to develop its target,” again 
via the intermediary. Id. at 23. This arrangement has the benefit of making it possible for researchers to 
run their assays against a wide range of molecules owned by a variety of firms. If there were a match, 
then the academic would commence second-tier negotiations in hopes of reaching a mutually acceptable 
agreement for the licensing of the target to the firm owning the relevant molecule. If the parties were 
unable to reach an agreement, then both the molecule and the target would still be protectable trade 
secrets by their respective inventors and thus still eligible for a future patent. Id. at 25. 
 88.  Budget, NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI. [NCATS], http://www.nc 
ats.nih.gov/about/budget/budget.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
 89.  Strategic Alliances, NCATS, http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/tech-transfer/alliances.html 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
 90.  About, EUROPEAN FED’N FOR PHARM. SCI., www.eufeps.org/about (last visited Nov. 19, 
2014). 
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initiatives to support the IMI research agenda and to retain its competitive 
advantage in pharmaceutical innovation.91 
In 2014, the NIH announced the Accelerating Medicines Partnership 
between the NIH and ten major pharmaceutical firms that agreed to share 
tissue and blood samples as well as data in hopes of identifying targets for 
new drugs to treat Alzheimer’s, lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, and type 2 
diabetes. The five-year collaboration, which is supported by $230 million 
in federal funding, is dedicated to decoding the biology behind these 
diseases. As NIH Director Francis Collins explained: “A drug company 
really wants to know where it should put its next billion-dollar bet in a new 
area of therapeutics.”92 
The NIH announced in 2015 that the patients and patient advocacy 
organizations involved in the Precision Medicine Initiative  (“PMI”) will be 
invited to work with “academic medical centers, clinicians, scientists from 
multiple disciplines with creative ideas about how to make this unique 
opportunity successful, pharmaceutical companies and medical product 
developers, scientific societies and research coalitions, privacy experts and 
medical ethicists.”93 Among the larger genome sequencing companies that 
could benefit from the PMI announced in 2015 are Roche Holding AG; 
Illumina Inc., which has an alliance with defense contractor Lockheed 
Martin for genomics development; and Thermo Fisher Scientific.94 
Meanwhile, both IBM and Google are among large firms expected to help 
store and interpret genomic and other data as well as electronic health 
records.95 
IV. UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Understanding the benefits and challenges of public-private 
cooperation in the development and commercialization of new drugs 
requires an appreciation of the roles played by governments, universities, 
and private firms. The first step in the development of a new drug in both 
the United States and Europe is frequently R&D done by a university and 
 
 91.  Gaspar et al., supra note 3, at 982. 
 92.  Monica Langley & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Drug Companies Join NIH in Study of Alzheimer’s, 
Diabetes, Rheumatoid Arthritis, Lupus, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10 
001424052702303519404579353442155924498. 
 93.  Participation, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, http://www. nih.gov/precisionmedicine/who.htm (last 
reviewed Feb. 9, 2015). 
 94.  Sharon Begley & Toni Clarke, Obama’s ‘Precision Medicine’ Plan to Boost Research, but 
Faces Hurdles, REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/28/us-health-
precisionmedicine-idUSKBN0L10D720150128. 
 95.  Id. 
 2015 PROMOTING “ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP” 21 
supported by government funds.96 Universities in both the United States 
and the EU frequently work with the private sector to commercialize their 
researchers’ discoveries.97 This is done both informally and formally. 
Informal mechanisms include scientific publications and presentations, as 
well as social networking between scientists and practitioners,98 which 
results in the exchange of ad-hoc advice and academic access to industrial 
know-how and facilities.99 Formal mechanisms include research contracts, 
professorial consulting engagements, licenses, and patent agreements.100 
The European Technology Transfer Offices circle (“European TTO 
circle”) likened European technology transfer to “an emerging industry: 
many valuable product ideas; a highly fragmented landscape; a lack of 
critical mass; wide disparities in terms of performances and developing 
practices.”101 This lackluster performance is due in part to an academic 
culture that has not historically valued commercialization102 and to 
uncertainty concerning who actually owns intellectual property stemming 
from government-funded research.103 As the European Commission 
recognized, the EU needs to take action to “unlock the potential of IPRs 
 
 96.  See Field, supra note 21, at 12. 
 97.  See Lawson, supra note 60, at 509. 
 98.  See Francesco Lissoni et al., Small Worlds in Networks of Inventors and the Role of 
Academics: An Analysis of France, 20 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 195, 197, 217 (2013) (finding that the 
presence of academic inventors and inventors from Centre National de la Recherché Scientifique 
(“CNRS”), the preeminent French public research organization, in company technological teams leads 
to “fast and widespread diffusion of technical and scientific knowledge,” especially in the fields of 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, and Chemicals and Materials). As Lissoni et al. point out, 
“Academic and CNRS inventors contribute to inventive activity not only in a direct way (that is, 
through the patents they produce) but also through their mobility across organizations, which may lead 
to knowledge diffusion and further inventive activity.” Id. at 217. 
 99.  Grimaldi et al., supra note 13, at 1046–47. 
 100.  Such agreements are often negotiated by university technology transfer offices (“TTOs”), also 
called technology licensing offices. Id. 
 101.  European Technology Transfer Offices Circle, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
jrc/en/tto-circle (last updated Apr. 30, 2014). 
 102.  As Michael S. Mireles explained, “the Bayh-Dole Act may not be successful in Europe and 
Japan—success judged by increased patenting and licensing—because of the differences in the history, 
practice, and structure of most European and Japanese university systems compared with the U.S. 
university system. It may take substantial change in the practice and structure of European and Japanese 
university systems for legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act to be successful.” Michael S. Mireles, 
Adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act in Developed Countries: Added Pressure for a Broad Research 
Exemption in the United States?, 59 ME. L. Rev. 259, 261 (2007). 
 103.  See Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: 
Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 119 (2007) 
(“[W]hat any given country views as ‘best practices’ in patent law may reflect other practices in other 
laws—including copyright, trade secret, utility model laws, and, above all, competition laws—that may 
vary widely from one country to another.”). 
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[intellectual property rights] that lie dormant in universities, research 
institutes and companies.”104 We agree. 
Although the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act,105 which facilitates the transfer of 
technology from U.S. universities to private industry, would give needed 
clarity to the ownership of inventions created by public institutions in the 
EU, we believe that wholesale copying of the Bayh-Dole approach in the 
EU would be a mistake. Indeed, there are aspects of the EU licensing 
regime for biotechnology patents that are instructive for U.S. policy 
makers. Accordingly, we discuss both the U.S. and European technology-
transfer regimes and compare academic patenting in the United States and 
EU before making our recommendations in Part VI. 
A. Laws Regulating Technology Transfer in the United States 
Prior to the enactment of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act in 1980,106 neither 
scientists nor universities in the United States could patent federally funded 
inventions.107 “Under the ‘commons’ model, the federal government 
sponsored basic research and encouraged its widespread publication in the 
public domain without regard for potential commercial applications.”108 
 
 104.  Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative, supra note 12, at 19. 
 105.  Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global Exportation of the US Bayh-Dole Act, 30 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 209 (2004). See also Econ. Policy Comm., Working Grp. on Research & Dev., Report on 
Research and Development, EPC/ECFIN/01/777-EN Final (Jan. 22, 2002). 
 106.  Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act (Bayh-Dole Act) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 
94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012)). That same year, Congress enacted 
the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–22 (2012)), which gave federal research laboratories the right to 
transfer technology developed in the government lab to a nongovernment entity, such as a private 
university or a for-profit firm. The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 amended the Stevenson-
Wydler Act and broadened the authority of agencies to enter into a cooperative research and 
development agreement (CRADA) with non-federal partners. Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (2012)).  CRADAs are “partnerships that allow for joint 
development with a negotiated set of contributions, responsibilities, and remuneration involving each 
party.” Field, supra note 21, at 24. Both the government agency and the private partner can contribute 
services, personnel, and property, but only the private party may contribute money. The government 
can license the technology to the private firm in exchange for a royalty or waive its ownership rights. 
Id. For example, in 1991 NIH entered into a CRADA with Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) for the anti-
cancer drug Taxol; under the terms of a 1996 licensing agreement, BMS paid NIH a royalty of 0.5% of 
BMS’s revenues from sales of the drug. Id. at 60. 
 107.  David C. Hoffman, A Modest Proposal: Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology Research 
Tools by Implementing a Broad Experimental Use Exception, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 997 (2004). 
See also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology 
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663–66 (1996). 
 108.  Hoffman, supra note 107, at 997. 
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Accordingly, the results of research funded with government grants became 
part of the public domain or were subject only to nonexclusive licenses.109 
1. The Bayh-Dole Act 
The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act was to facilitate the 
commercialization of government-funded research by establishing a 
uniform set of rules for designating ownership of federally funded 
inventions. The Act creates a presumption “that universities own inventions 
that are developed under their watch.”110 To promote commercialization, 
especially of inventions that require substantial additional R&D and testing 
to get to market,111 Bayh-Dole requires universities (and other non-profit 
grantees) to seek to commercialize federally funded research through 
patents and licensing or to offer to give the exclusive rights to the invention 
back to the government.112 “[N]onprofit organizations may retain exclusive 
title to inventions developed with federal funding, and may freely license 
such inventions, so long as all resulting profits are used to fund additional 
 
 109.  Id. at 1004–06. In contrast, “in Canada, since time in memorial [sic], almost since the 
Flintstones were pushing their stone wheel bicycles around, the universities have had control of the 
intellectual property. It was up to them to decide or negotiate with their faculty whether it was owned 
by the inventor or the university.” Thomas Brzustowski, Government Assistance to and Policy Toward 
Innovation, 32 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 40, 49 (2006). Canada not only gives universities the right to keep the 
profits generated by the commercialization of government-funded research, it also actively encourages 
commercialization and provides financial incentives to “support academic institutions in identifying 
intellectual property with commercial potential and forging partnerships with the private sector to 
commercialize research results.” Jocelyn Downie & Matthew Herder, Reflections on the 
Commercialization of Research Conducted in Public Institutions in Canada, 1 MCGILL HEALTH L. 
PUBL. 23, 27–28 (2007) (quoting Executive Summary: Achieving Excellence, GOV’T OF CANADA). 
 110.  Robert M. Yeh, The Public Paid for the Invention: Who Owns It?, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
453, 453–54 (2012). Although universities may be entitled to patent rights, disputes may arise as to 
which university first filed for a particular patent. In 2015, a patent for the CRISPR-Cas9 genome 
editing technology was awarded to Dr. Feng Zhang, a scientist at the Broad Institute and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. One potential use for this technology is helping to “rewrite 
flawed genes in people, opening tremendous new possibilities for treating, even curing, diseases.” 
Andrew Pollack, The Gene Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2015, at D1. In April 2015, the University of 
California, Berkeley, requested that the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office review the patent award, 
arguing that Dr. Jennifer A. Doudna, a biochemist at the university, and the University of California 
were the first to file for the patent. The patent rights are expected to be “highly lucrative,” and both 
scientists have formed competing companies with rights to their patents and pending patents. Id. “[This] 
high-profile legal fight could end up reflecting badly on the universities, who all used public tax dollars 
or philanthropic gifts to make the inventions.” Antonio Regalado, CRISPR Patent Fight Now a Winner-
Take-All Match, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/536736/ 
crispr-patent-fight-now-a-winner-take-all-match/. 
 111.  Hoffman, supra note 107, at 1007 n.96. 
 112.  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(3); see also Sean O’Connor et al., Legal Context of University Intellectual 
Property and Technology Transfer (paper commissioned by The Nat’l Acads. of Scis., Eng’g, & Med., 
Sept. 20, 2010), http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_058 
897.pdf. 
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scientific research and development.”113 In short, in exchange for patenting 
government-funded inventions, both public and private universities in the 
United States can charge and retain licensing fees and royalties.114 Thus, if 
a university elects to retain title to a government-funded invention, “the 
individual inventor (who is typically employed by the institution) has no 
further rights.”115 As discussed below, the university is, however, required 
to share royalties with the inventor.116 
The Act requires that all universities that enter into research funding 
contracts with a federal agency “disclose each subject invention to the 
Federal agency within a reasonable time after it becomes known to 
contractor personnel responsible for the administration of patent 
matters.”117 To meet this requirement, universities generally require all 
researchers to disclose all inventions to the university’s technology transfer 
office. The institution has two years from the time it discloses the 
government-funded invention to the federal agency to decide whether the 
institution wants to retain title.118 If the institution decides to retain title, it 
must make a written election to that effect.119 The Act also states “[t]hat the 
Federal Government may receive title to any subject invention in which the 
contractor does not elect to retain rights or fails to elect rights within such 
times.”120 
Although the government has a “march-in” right to circumvent a 
patent when a product is “potentially lifesaving,” it has apparently never  
been exercised.121 In addition, federally funded researchers are required to 
grant the federal government a nonexclusive license to use federally funded 
inventions.122 Once the patent expires, the invention becomes part of the 
public domain. 
 
 113.   Fenn v. Yale Univ., 393 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D. Conn. 2004) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 202(a), 
and 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(b)) (stating that “[t]he Contractor may retain the entire right, title, and interest 
throughout the world to each subject invention subject to the provisions of this clause and 35 U.S.C. § 
203”). 
 114.  DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-
INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 43–46 (2004). 
 115.  Fenn, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 137. 
 116.  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B). 
 117.  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1). 
 118.  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2). 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Field, supra note 21, at 24 n.124; Hoffman, supra note 107, at 999, 1008 (“In the presumably 
infrequent cases in which ‘a licensee fail[ed] . . . to commercialize [a] technology,’ the Act allowed a 
third party to petition the government for the right to license it for commercial purposes . . . . 
Unsurprisingly, the federal government has never exercised its ‘march-in’ rights.”). 
 122.  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4). 
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2. Employers’ Rights to Inventions Created by Employees Hired to 
Invent and Contractual Assignments of Inventions 
U.S. patent law’s “hired-to-invent” doctrine gives an employer the 
right to all inventions developed by employees specifically hired to invent. 
The hired-to-invent doctrine requires that the employee-inventor assign the 
invention to the employer, even in the absence of a written agreement 
requiring such an assignment.123 In the case of inventions by employees not 
hired to invent, the employer may still obtain the rights to employee 
inventions as a matter of contract through an assignment of inventions,124 
which employees are often required to sign before beginning work. 
Many U.S. universities require that researchers assign their inventions 
to the university regardless of the source of funding. For example, the 
Technology Licensing Office at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(“M.I.T.”) issued the following policy statements: 
 
Patents, copyrights on software, maskworks, and tangible research 
property and trademarks developed by faculty, students, staff and others, 
including visitors participating in M.I.T. programs or using M.I.T. funds 
or facilities, are owned by M.I.T. when either of the following applies: 
1. The intellectual property was developed in the course of or pursuant to 
a sponsored research agreement with M.I.T.; or 
2. The intellectual property was developed with significant use of funds 
or facilities administered by M.I.T. . . . 125 
 
 
 
 123.  Joshua L. Simmons, Inventions Made for Hire, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1, 14–15 
(2012). Title does not immediately vest in the employer upon invention. Id. at 15. Factors a court will 
review to determine if an inventor has been hired to invent include, for example, previous assignments 
of patents by the employee, customary practice in the company who originally posed the problem 
solved by the invention, and whether the invention was created during the period of employment. Id. at 
15 n.55; see also William C. Lewis, Hey! You Stole the Invention I Paid You to Invent!, NEXSEN PRUET 
LLC (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.martindale.com/labor-employment-law/article_Nexsen-Pruet-
LLC_1358040.htm (“The ‘hired to invent’ doctrine is an exception to the rule that an inventor owns all 
rights to the invention. In general, someone hired to invent something who succeeds in accomplishing 
the task during the performance of the contract is bound to assign all rights to the invention to the 
person that hired them.”). 
 124.  Assignment agreements vary in their terms. For example, some include “unconditional 
general assignment” policies obligating staff to assign all inventions; some agreements assign rights 
“only for special projects or sponsored research,” and some determine ownership on a case-by-case 
basis. See Sean M. O’Connor, The Real Issue Behind Stanford v. Roche: Faulty Conceptions of 
University Assignment Policies Stemming from the 1947 Biddle Report, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 2, 379, 393 (2013). 
 125.  Part 2: MIT Policy Statements, § 2.1, MASS. INST. OF TECH. TECH. LICENSING OFFICE, 
http://tlo.mit.edu/community/policies/part2 (last visited July 13, 2015) [hereinafter M.I.T. POLICIES]. 
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It goes on to provide: 
 
PATENTS: Research contracts sponsored by the Federal Government 
are subject to statutes and regulations under which M.I.T. acquires title 
in inventions conceived or first reduced to practice in the performance of 
the research. M.I.T.’s ownership is subject to a nonexclusive license to 
the government and the requirement that M.I.T. retain title and take 
effective steps to develop the practical applications of the invention by 
licensing and other means. Contracts with industrial sponsors provide 
that M.I.T. retain ownership of patents while the sponsor is granted an 
option to acquire license rights.126 
 
Universities aggressively protect their rights to employees’ inventions, 
as illustrated by Fenn v. Yale University.127 Yale University Professor and 
Nobel laureate in Chemistry John B. Fenn was issued United States Patent 
No. 5,130,538 (‘538 patent) on July 14, 1992 for a chemical mass 
spectometry invention. In 2003, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Connecticut concluded that Fenn had breached Yale’s internal patent 
policy, under which he was “contractually bound and which gave the 
university right of first refusal to patent any faculty inventions.”128 The 
court found that Fenn’s failure to be “straightforward” with the university 
induced Yale not to assert its ownership rights, giving Fenn the opportunity 
to secretly file the application himself. In 2005, the court went further, 
holding that Yale was entitled to treble damages because  Fenn had 
committed conversion and statutory theft.129 In addition, the Court ordered 
Fenn to assign his interests under the ‘538 patent to Yale, as required under  
Yale’s 1989 patent policy. The court wrote that Fenn could not profit from 
his own wrongdoing and that the patent could be reassigned to Yale, its 
rightful owner.130 Fenn was ordered to pay Yale $545,000 in royalties as 
well as Yale’s legal costs of almost $500,000.131 
 
 126.  Id. § 2.1.1. 
 127.  See generally Fenn v. Yale Univ., 2005 WL 327138 (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2005). 
 128.  Id. at *2. 
 129.  Id. at *4. 
 130.  Id. at *6. 
 131.  Marius Meland, Judge Rules for Yale in Patent Dispute with Former Professor, LAW360 
(Feb. 15, 2005), http://www.law360.com/articles/3016/judge-rules-for-yale-in-patent-dispute-with-
former-professor. For his part, Fenn had testified that he had filed his own patent on May, 19, 1989 “in 
an attempt to ‘show up how [Yale] handled its business, which in my view was incompetent.’” Fenn, 
2005 WL 327138, at *4. Yale’s Office of Collaborative Research had not filed a patent application 
covering Fenn’s invention by May 19, 1989, even though the last day to file for a patent was June 1, 
1989. Id. 
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State labor laws impose some limits on an employer’s ability to 
require employees to assign all inventions. For example, California law 
provides that an employer may not require an employee to assign an 
invention that the employee developed entirely on his or her own time 
without using the employer’s equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade secret 
information except for those inventions that either (1) relate to, at the time 
the invention was conceived or reduced to practice, the employer’s 
business or the actual or demonstrably anticipated research or development 
of the employer; or (2) result from any work the employee performed for 
the employer.132 However, this limited carve-out will not prevent 
universities from laying claim to most university researchers’ inventions. 
3. Compensation for Inventors 
The Bayh-Dole Act includes a provision requiring a non-profit 
contractor to share royalties with the inventor.133 However, it neither 
dictates the percentage of royalties that must be paid to the inventor,134 nor 
prescribes a minimum payment.135 Instead, “[t]he provision that non-profit 
institutions share royalties was included merely to ensure that inventors 
were provided with an adequate incentive to engage in scientific 
research.”136 Congress intended that “any sharing ratio should be left to the 
supply and demand of the market.”137 
It is, therefore, not surprising that royalty agreements vary by 
university or research institute. Certain institutions share a fixed percentage 
of the revenue (after deducting specified costs) generated from licensing 
the technology, while others implement a sliding scale system whereby the 
percentage of revenues paid out declines as the amount of revenue 
increases.138 
For example, Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research pays its 
inventor-employees five percent of the royalties it receives from their 
 
 132.  CAL. LABOR CODE § 2870(a) (West 2015). 
 133.  35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B). 
 134.  Alan S. Gutterman, Bayh-Dole Act—Royalty Sharing Requirements, in BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 209:24, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2015). 
 135.  Platzer v. Sloan-Kettering Inst. for Cancer Res., 787 F. Supp. 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(holding that “Congress’ concern was with the reinvesting of funds to further research, not with 
furthering the private interests of individual inventors”). 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Gutterman, supra note 134, § 209:24. 
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inventions pursuant to a sliding scale set forth in the Institute’s patent 
policy.139 Meanwhile, Stanford University’s  
 
royalty-sharing policy provides for the distribution of cash net royalties 
(defined as gross royalties less 15% for OTL’s [Office of Technology 
Licensing’s] administrative expenses, minus direct expenses) to 
inventors, their departments, and their schools. In 2012–13, inventors 
received personal income of $21.7M, departments received $19.4M, and 
schools received $18.8M. The University assessed an infrastructure 
charge on the department and school shares of royalty income.140  
 
Thus, of the $87 million in gross royalty revenues received by Stanford in 
2012–2013, the individual inventors received 25%.141 
 In contrast, M.I.T. distributes one third of the Adjusted Royalty 
Income received from licensees to the inventors.142 “Adjusted Royalty 
Income” is equal to the gross royalty income less (1) a 15% administrative 
fee and (2) out-of-pocket costs not reimbursed by the licensees, including 
patent filing, prosecution and maintenance fees, and certain marketing 
expenses.143 If M.I.T. acquires from a company to which intellectual 
property is transferred “equity in lieu or partial lieu of royalties for 
intellectual property,” any inventor who receives an equity position from 
that company does not share in M.I.T.’s equity. For all other inventors, 
M.I.T. distributes cash to the inventors upon occurrence of a liquidation 
event proportionate to what their cash share would have been had no equity 
been issued to the university.144 Although Yale University increased the 
percentage of net royalties paid to academic inventors from 15% to 50% in 
1975,145 it reduced that amount in 1984 to 30% of net royalty income up to 
$200,000 and 20% of net royalty income in excess of $200,000.146 The 
University of Wisconsin, which operates one of the most successful public 
university technology transfer operations in the United States, the 
 
 139.  Platzer, 787 F. Supp. at 362. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
rejected the inventors’ claim for a larger percentage. Id. at 368. 
 140.  STANFORD UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. LICENSING, TRANSLATING POTENTIAL: ANNUAL REPORT 
(2013), http://otl.stanford.edu/documents/otlar13.pdf. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  M.I.T. POLICIES, supra note 125, § 4.8(A). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. § 4.9.2. 
 145.  Fenn v. Yale Univ., 283 F. Supp. 2d 615, 622 (D. Conn. 2003). 
 146.  Id. at 623. 
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Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (“WARF”),147 gives academic 
inventors 20% of the royalties (before expenses) earned from their 
discoveries.148 Although all faculty, staff, and students must disclose their 
discoveries and inventions to WARF,149 it does not require academic 
inventors to assign their inventions to the university except where required 
by funding agreements, as where inventions are funded in whole or in part 
by federal research grants.150 WARF also returns 15% of royalties to the 
inventors’ departments to fund future research.151  
4. University Technology Transfer Offices 
University technology transfer offices function as the central 
clearinghouse for university-generated inventions, especially patents.152 For 
example, M.I.T.’s Technology Licensing Office pursues  
 
the licensing of technology by researching the market for the technology, 
 identifying third parties to commercialize it, entering into discussions 
with potential licensees, negotiating appropriate licenses or other 
agreements,  monitoring progress, and distribu-ting royalties to the 
inventors/authors in  accordance with M.I.T. royalty policy. When it is 
appropriate to do so, M.I.T. may accept an equity position in partial lieu 
of cash royalties.153 
 
The returns generated by the Stanford University and the University of 
Wisconsin technology transfer offices, discussed below, show how 
significant the financial returns can be. 
 
 147.  For UW Inventors, WIS. ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUND., http://www.warf.org/for-uw-
inventors.cmsx (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (“Few institutions offer such generous returns, or have been 
as successful placing technologies and defending intellectual property.”). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  After disclosing an invention to WARF that was not federally funded (or subject to another 
funding agreement), the inventor “is free to dispose of the rights to the invention in the manner of his or 
her choosing.” Ownership and Equity Review, UNIV. OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, https://research.wi 
sc.edu/projectagreementsip/intellectualprop/ownership/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). If WARF has 
expressed an interest in protecting the invention, the inventor may then choose to work with WARF. Id. 
“The UW is unique among U.S. universities in that it does not claim ownership rights in the intellectual 
property generated by its faculty, staff, or students, except when required by funding agreements.” 
Intellectual Property, UNIV. OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, https://research.wisc.edu/projectagreementsip/ 
intellectualprop/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
 151.  For UW Inventors, supra note 147. 
 152.  They play a much less significant role in open source projects and informal collaborations. 
See generally M.I.T. POLICIES, supra note 125; For UW Inventors, supra note 147. 
 153.  M.I.T. POLICIES, supra note 125, § 4.1. 
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Stanford’s Office of Technology Licensing (“OTL”) spent $9.3 
million on patent and other legal expenses in fiscal year 2013, of which $4 
million was reimbursed by licensees.154 Excluding patent expenses, its 
operating budget was $6.6 million.155 The OTL reported that in the period 
from 2012 to 2013 Stanford “received $87M in gross royalty revenue from 
622 technologies, with royalties ranging from less than $10 to $55M. 
Forty-two of the 622 inventions generated $100,000 or more in royalties. 
Six inventions generated $1M or more.”156 As of August 31, 2013, Stanford 
held equity in 161 companies, issued pursuant to license agreements.157 
In fiscal year 2013, Stanford’s Industrial Contracts Office, a part of 
OTL, entered into 110 new specialized research agreements with industrial 
firms that “fund, and sometimes collaborate on, research projects in 
Stanford laboratories.”158 These agreements included (1) several projects 
funded by the global chemical company BASF with Stanford investigators 
in materials science using “plasma-enhanced atomic layer deposition to 
grow oxide layers with precise thickness control for electronics” and (2) 
projects funded by Boeing involving researchers in the School of 
Engineering “studying high-performance and reliable composite adhesive 
bonding for aerospace systems” and “researching fiber optical sensors and 
solar energy conversion for aerospace applications.”159 
In the fiscal year ending June 30, 2014, the Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation earned $43.4 million in royalties and licensing fees 
and net income of $318.7 million from its investment portfolio.160 WARF 
paid university inventors $11.5 million, awarded University of Wisconsin 
at Madison $59.3 million in grants, and provided a $14.3 million grant to 
the Morgridge Institute for Research, a private, non-profit research center 
that partners with the University of Wisconsin at Madison “to explore new, 
uncharted scientific territory.”161 Since its inception in 1925, WARF has 
provided more than $2.3 billion to the University of Wisconsin at Madison 
and the Morgridge Institute for Research “in the form of direct grants and 
more than $300 million to faculty inventors, all adjusted for inflation.”162 In 
 
 154.  STANFORD UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. LICENSING, supra note 140. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Financials, WIS. ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUND., http://www.warf.org/stewardship/financials/ 
financials.cmsx (last visited July 16, 2015). 
 161.  Id.; Our Relationship with UW-Madison, MORGRIDGE INST. FOR RESEARCH, http:// 
morgridge.org/about/our-relationship-with-uw/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
 162.  Financials, supra note 160. 
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addition, since 1999, it has provided more than $500 million of in-kind 
support.163 
Although much of the empirical work on academic entrepreneurship 
has focused on patenting activities, it is important to keep in mind other 
forms of intellectual property protection, such as copyrights and trade 
secret protections, as well as open source initiatives and informal                                                   
collaboration among academics and industrial researchers164 when crafting 
public policy and university rules. 
B.  Laws Regulating Technology Transfer in the European Union 
The European Commission stated in 2010 that meeting the goals of 
the Innovation Union will require (1) giving researchers and innovators the 
ability “to move easily between public and private institutes,” (2) clear 
rules on the ownership of intellectual property rights, and (3) “sharing and 
support systems . . . to facilitate knowledge transfer and the creation of 
university spin-offs and to attract (venture) capital and business angels.”165 
1. Allocation of Ownership Rights Between the University and Its 
Researchers 
Because the EC has not specified who owns academic inventions 
funded by the government, the twenty-eight Member States have 
established their own rules allocating the rights to intellectual property 
developed in university laboratories.166 These national rules vary 
significantly in both form and substance. Many have been amended in the 
last several decades to promote commercialization of university 
technology, in part to supplement limited government funding for public 
universities.167 There is also no standard legislative model in the EU or its 
Member States specifying the employer’s and the employee’s right to 
inventions or the employee’s right to compensation.168 
 
(1) The differing regimes within Europe mean that the original owner of 
IP resulting from collaborative research can be the institution, individual 
researchers, students, the industry partner or a combination of these. 
 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  See Antonio Della Malva et al., Institutional Change and Academic Patenting: French 
Universities and the Innovation Act of 1999, 23 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 211, 217–18 (2013). 
 165.  Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative, supra note 12, at 34. 
 166.  Sanna Wolk, EU Intellectual Property Law and Ownership in Employment Relationships, 56 
SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 419, 421 (2010). 
 167.  Malva et al., supra note 164, at 214. 
 168.  Wolk, supra note 166, at 420. 
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(2) Ownership of any background knowledge necessary for the 
commercialization of that IP may rest with any of the parties involved in 
the research project, or even with third parties.169   
 
 Historically, many European countries honored the “professor’s 
privilege,” which gave faculty members the right to retain ownership of 
inventions created in the course of their employment.170 This exempted 
professors from the usual rules giving non-academic employers the right to 
employee inventions arising out of an employee’s assigned duties.171 
Certain Member States, including Sweden, continue to honor the privilege. 
Professors in such States own the rights to their inventions and have the 
ability to license them to others, including for-profit entities.172 According 
to the European Commission, Sweden had “the best performing innovation 
system in the EU [in 2013], followed by Denmark, Germany and 
Finland.”173 
The United Kingdom was the first European country to eliminate the 
professor’s privilege.174 The United Kingdom Patent Act of 1977175 
provides that academic researchers employed by a university do not own 
their inventions. In 1985, the U.K. went a step further and gave universities 
the right to patent their faculty members’ inventions and license them to 
third parties.176 Prior to that time, a public agency, the British Technology 
Group, was the “nominal” owner177 of academic discoveries.178 Austria, 
 
 169.  CREST EUROPEAN UNION SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL RESEARCH COMM., FINAL REPORT OF 
THE CREST OMC EXPERT GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15 (2006). 
 170.  Malva et al., supra note 164, at 214; see infra notes 319–22 and accompanying text. 
 171.  Malva et al., supra note 164, at 214 n.4. 
 172.  Ashley J. Stevens & April E. Effort, Using Academic License Agreements to Promote Global 
Social Responsibility, 43 LES NOUVELLES 85, 98 (2008). 
 173.  EUROPEAN COMM’N, INNOVATION UNION SCOREBOARD 2014, at 4 (2014), http://ec.eur 
opa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/ius/ius-2014_en.pdf. Switzerland was the European 
innovation leader, outperforming all of the EU Member States. Id. 
 174.  Malva et al., supra note 164, at 214. 
 175.  Patents Act, 1977, C. 37, §§ 39(1), 40(1), 40(2) (U.K.). 
 176.  In 1950, Treasury Circular TC 5/50 “granted the ‘right of first refusal’ of patents created in 
universities by public funds to the [National Research Development Corporation (NRDC)].” Daidree 
Tofano, Edwin Southern’s Microarray: Policy and Intellectual Property Considerations 15 (Apr. 25, 
2006) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Duke University) (available through Duke University at 
http://hdl.handle.net/10161/8114). NRDC later merged with the National Enterprise Board, creating the 
British Technology Group. Id. at 16. TC 5/50 was rescinded in 1985, effectively allowing universities to 
“patent and exploit” their intellectual property. Id. at 17–18. A Treasury circular serves as “guidance to 
governmental departments” and is not legislation. As such, it may be passed or rescinded without the 
approval of Parliament and is “subject to change at any time as is seen fit.” Id. at 15, 17 n.71. 
 177.  Malva et al., supra note 164, at 214. 
 178.  Maxine Clarke, British Technology Group – UK Technology Transfer Grows, NATURE, Aug. 
1, 1985, at 385. 
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Denmark, and Germany all abolished the privilege between 2000 and 
2002.179 “This ‘abolitionist movement’ in Europe came from the wish of 
policymakers to recreate similar conditions to those in the U.S., where 
universities retain all IPRs over the results of publicly funded research.”180 
Italy decided to introduce the privilege in 2001.181 Interestingly, Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, and Italy all based their new laws on the need to 
promote commercialization.182  
Certain countries, including Austria,183 France,184 Hungary,185 Italy,186 
 
 179.  Malva et al., supra note 164, at 214. 
 180.  Francesco Lissoni et al., Academic Patenting and the Professor’s Privilege: Evidence on 
Denmark from the KEINS Database, 36 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 595, 595 (2009) (finding that in the first 
years following Denmark’s abolition of the professor’s privilege, a considerable amount of patenting 
activity moved from the professors to the universities; further finding that before and after abolition of 
the privilege the bulk of academic patenting consists of inventions owned by business companies). 
 181.  Malva et al., supra note 164, at 214. Article 65 of the Italian Industrial Property Code, 
enforced by Legislative Decree n. 30, enacted on February 10, 2005, provides that a researcher working 
for a university becomes the owner of all rights related to the patented invention, and each university 
can determine by itself the maximum amount of royalties that are to be paid to the university by a third 
party who gets the license to use the invention. Country Overview: Italia – Who Owns IP in Research 
and Development, BIOLEGIS, http://www.biolegis.com/uploads/tx_articles/Who_owns_IP_Natale_Tulli 
___Associati_2011.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) (referencing CODICE DELLA PROPRIETA’ 
INDUSTRIALE [INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CODE] art. 64, enforced by Decreto Legislativo 10 febbraio 2005, 
n. 30 (It.). 
 182.  Malva et al., supra note 164, at 214. 
 183.  Austrian Patent Law entitles an employee to an “adequate, special compensation” for 
assigning an invention to the employer. If the employment is regulated under civil law, the rights to 
employee inventions must be transferred to the employer only if the transfer was agreed to in writing. 
The special compensation is paid in addition to an employee’s ordinary salary. The amount is 
determined on a case by case basis and considers the economic importance of the invention; other 
exploitations of the invention; and the extent to which the support of the employer’s resources 
contributed to the invention. No additional compensation is paid to employees who are explicitly hired 
for inventive activities. For employment relationships that are covered by public law (“civil servants, 
which may also include university employees”), the employer has the right to demand the transfer of the 
rights to the employee’s invention even if the transfer was not agreed to in writing. Public employees 
are also entitled to appropriate compensation for the transfer. See Compensating Employee Inventors, 
TAYLORWESSING (Jan. 2014), http://www.taylorwessing.com/synapse/ti_compensation_employee_ 
inventors.html; Country Overview: Austria – Who Owns IP in Research & Development, BIOLEGIS, 
http://www.biolegis.com/uploads/tx_articles/Who_owns_IP-austria.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2014); 
PATENTGESETZ 1970 [PAT G] [PATENT LAW] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 259/1970, as 
amended (Austria). 
 184.  CODE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] art. L.611-7 
(Fr.). The French Innovation Act of 1999 “added explicitly the commercial exploitation of patents and 
licenses to the universities’ mission, on the same footing as teaching and research” and made it possible 
for universities and public research organizations to create technology transfer offices, “to staff them 
with external personnel, and to run them according to business-like budgetary and accounting rules.” 
Malva et al., supra note 164, at 218. The Ministry of Research enacted “guidelines for university-
industry cooperation, which included the recommendation to adopt an intellectual property charter (so 
that, especially in universities, IPR [intellectual property right] matters could be explicitly regulated) as 
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the Netherlands,187 Poland,188 Portugal,189 and Spain,190 include employee 
inventor compensation provisions in their national patent legislation, while 
 
well as negotiation with companies of ‘joint ownership agreements’ over the results of collaborative 
R&D.” Id. 
 185.  An employee invention is defined as “an invention made by a person who, without being 
under an obligation by reason of his employment, makes an invention, the exploitation of which falls 
within the field of business of his employer.” 1995. évi XXXIII. törvény a Találmányok Szabadalmi 
Oltalmáról, art. 9(2) (Act No. XXXIII of 1995 on the Protection of Inventions by Patents) (Hung.), 
translation at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/hu/hu048en.pdf. “Remuneration for the right 
to exploit an employee invention shall be paid by the employer,” and the remuneration amount for that 
right “shall be equal to that which would be payable by the employer for a license, on the basis of a 
patent license agreement,” after considering licensing conditions in the field of the invention. Id. art. 14. 
“Universities and third parties usually conclude research agreements under the Hungarian Civil Code” 
where the obligor performs research services and the sponsor pays remuneration; “[i]n practice, the 
parties agree that the sponsor of the research acquires all IP rights.” Country Overview: Hungary – Who 
Owns IP in Research & Development, SZECSKAY, http://www.biolegis.com/uploads/tx_articles/ 
Who_owns_IP_ Szecskay_ 2011.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
 186.  In Italy, when “inventions [are] produced occasionally by the employee, during his free time, 
by using his personal technical instruments but exploiting the know how of the employer[,]” the 
employee owns the rights related to the invention, but the employer has the right to use or buy the 
patents from the inventor. Country Overview: Italia, supra note 181. “In any case, the author will be 
granted not less than 50% of the total amount of the royalties deriving from the license of the 
invention.” Id. 
 187.  In the Netherlands, article 12 (1) of the Patent Act of 1995 provides that, in a “regular 
employment relationship,” the person who makes the invention may claim the patent. A “more 
favourable rule is set out in Article 12 (3)” for universities and research institutions—if the invention is 
made by a university or research institution employee, the employer is entitled to the patent, but the 
parties may alter this by agreement. Equitable remuneration is generally required for the employee if 
not provided for in the employment contract. Country Overview: The Netherlands  Who Owns IP in 
Research and Development, BIOLEGIS, http://www.biolegis.com/uploads/tx_articles/Who_owns_IP-
olanda.pd (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
 188.  In Poland, the “default rule” for ownership of industrial property, as stated in article 11, 
section 3 of the Industrial Property Law of 2000, as amended, is that the employer owns industrial 
property created by an employee, unless otherwise agreed. IP Management, Cooperation Between EU 
& Strategic Partners, Poland, HEIP-LINK, http://www.heip-link.net/content/subject/poland (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2014). When an invention is made by a creator with the help of an economic entity, the 
economic entity may enjoy the right to exploit the invention in its own field of development. Id. 
(referencing article 11, section 5 of Industrial Property Law of 2000). 
 189.  Industrial property law covers patent innovation in Portugal. If “inventive activity is provided 
for” in an employment contract, the patent belongs to the company, and the inventor is entitled to 
remuneration. Country Overview: Portugal – Who Owns IP in Research & Development, BIOLEGIS 
(Oct. 2011), http://www.biolegis.com/uploads/tx_articles/Who_owns_IP__CRA_Law_2011.pdf 
(referencing CÓDIGO DA PROPRIEDADE INDUSTRIAL (C.P.I.) (INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CODE) (Port.)). 
 190.  Article 17 of the Spanish Patent Act states that if an employee made an invention “related to 
his professional activity in the company and the knowledge acquired into the company had influenced 
predominantly his invention or he had utilized company’s means to achieve it, the employer would have 
the right to the invention’s ownership or to reserve a right to use the invention for himself,” and the 
worker is entitled to a fair economic compensation. Country Overview: Spain – Who Owns IP in 
Research & Development, BIOLEGIS, http://www.biolegis.com/uploads/tx_articles/Who_owns_IP_ 
Spain.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
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Denmark,191 Finland,192 Germany,193 and Norway194 have enacted specific 
employee compensation laws.195 In contrast, other countries apply general 
principles of labor law. As a result, there is a non-transparent and non-
uniform system for determining who owns university inventions created in 
the EU. 
 For example, the German Employees’ Inventions Act provides that 
a university can claim exclusive rights to employment inventions created 
by university researchers and research associates working on its campus 
using government funding.196 Section 4 of the Act defines employment 
inventions “as those, that are made during the duration of the service or 
employment contract, and that have either developed from such activities 
of the inventor as were part of his work, or which are significantly based on 
 
 191.  Bekendtgørelse af lov om arbejdstageres opfindelser (Consolidate Act. No. 104 on 
Employees’ Inventions), Jan. 24, 2012, § 5 (Den.); Bekendtgørelse af lov om opfindelser ved offentlige 
forskningsinstitutioner (Consolidate Act. No. 210 on Inventions at Public Research Institutions), Mar. 
17, 2009, § 8 (Den.). 
 192.  In Finland, the Act on the Right in Employee Inventions provides that an employee shall have 
the same rights to his or her invention as other inventors, unless otherwise provided by legislation. 
Generally, an employee owns all rights to an invention created by him or her; a specific procedure and 
assignment is required to render the invention the property of the employer. The employee is entitled to 
a “reasonable compensation” if the employer decides to assume the rights to an invention. Linda 
Berggren, Finland: Employee Inventions, BORENIUS LTD. (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.mondaq.com/x/ 
55254/employee+rights+labour+relations/Employee+Inventions. The law applies to both private and 
public employment and its provisions are “mainly non-mandatory,” meaning it applies only in the 
absence of a separate contractual arrangement. Id. The Employee Invention Act does not apply to 
university researchers, whose rights are provided by the Act on the Right in Inventions Made at Higher 
Education Institutions (University Inventions Act). This law “extends the possibility for universities to 
assume the rights of inventions conceived within the domain of the institution”; prior to the law, the 
researchers were entitled to retain the rights to their inventions, unless otherwise agreed. If the research 
involves a party outside the university (collaborative research), the university has the right to acquire 
the right to the invention. For research not involving outside parties (open research), the inventor may 
retain the right to the invention. If the university acquired rights to the invention, the researcher is 
entitled to a “reasonable compensation,” the amount of which is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
 193.  Gesetz über Arbeitnehmererfindungen [ArbNErfG] [Employees’ Inventions Act], July 25, 
1957, BGBL. I at 756, last amended by Gesetz [G], July 31, 2009, BGBL. I at 2521, ch. 2, § 6 (Ger.). 
 194.  The Norwegian Employee Invention Act provides that when an invention results from a 
specified task assigned to an employee as part of his or her employment, the employer is “entitled to 
have all or part of the rights to the invention transferred to it if the exploitation of the invention comes 
within the sphere of the company’s activity.” Ingeborg Moen Borgerud et al., Employment and 
Employee Benefits in Norway: Overview, PRACTICAL L. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://us.practicallaw.com/3-
507-2636#a358906. The employee has the right to be compensated for patentable inventions that are 
transferred. The Employee Invention Act can be modified by contract, but the right to compensation 
cannot be eliminated. Id. 
 195.  See Maximilian Haedicke, Ownership, in PATENT LAW: A HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN AND 
GERMAN PATENT LAW 242, 242 (Maximilian Haedicke & Henrik Timmann eds., 2013). 
 196.  Gesetz über Arbeitnehmererfindungen [ArbNErfG] [Employees’ Inventions Act], ch. 3, § 42 
(Ger.). 
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experiences or work of the university.”197 The Act requires the employee to 
notify the employer in writing of service inventions, after which the 
university “as employer” may claim the right to such inventions.198 If an 
employer does not explicitly waive its claim to the invention within four 
months of the notification, the invention will belong to the employer.199 
Service inventions that have been expressly released by the employer 
within four months, as well as free inventions (employees’ inventions that 
“cannot be attributed to company activities”) are generally at the free 
disposal of the employee-inventor, except that Sections 18 and 19 of the 
German Employees’ Inventions Act require that the employee give the 
university notice of each invention and offer the university a nonexclusive 
right to make use of the invention before it is otherwise utilized.200 
Several national patent acts permit universities and their researchers to 
allocate the ownership rights to intellectual property developed in 
university labs by contract, even if the research is government funded. The 
Danish Act on Inventions at Public Research Institutions (“DAIPRI”) 
applies to inventions that can be patented by the Danish Patent Act. As a 
general rule, the right to inventions made by a university employee belongs 
to the employee under Section 7 of DAIPRI.201 The university may, 
however, pursuant to Section 8(1), claim the rights to the invention if it was 
made as part of the employee’s work for the university.202 If the research is 
funded in cooperation with a party not covered by DAIPRI, the university 
may, “on its own and the employee’s behalf,” in accordance with Section 9, 
enter into an agreement at the outset waiving the right to the inventions, in 
full or in part, resulting from the research.203 Thus, in certain Member 
States, the legislative terms are default provisions that may be modified by 
 
 197.  Patents and Licenses: The Legal Protection of Research Achievements, HUMBOLD-
UNIVERSITÄT ZU BERLIN (July 17, 2013), https://www.hu-berlin.de/research/transfer/patente_lizenzen/ 
pl_pat_rec_html [hereinafter Patents and Licenses]. 
 198.  Approaches to Compensating Inventive Employees, in the UK and Germany, OSBORNE 
CLARKE (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.osborneclarke.com/connected-insights/publications/approaches-
compensating-inventive-employees-uk-and-germany/. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Patents and Licenses, supra note 197; Employee Inventions Law, BARDEHLE PAGENBERG, 
http://www.bardehle.com/en/publications/interactive_brochures/employee_inventions_law.html (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
 201.  Bekendtgørelse af lov om opfindelser ved offentlige forskningsinstitutioner (Consolidate Act. 
No. 210 on Inventions at Public Research Institutions), Mar. 17, 2009, § 7(1) (Den.). 
 202.  Id. § 8(1). 
 203.  Id. § 9(1). The Danish Act on Inventions at Public Research Institutions applies to universities 
governed by the Danish University Act, governmental research institutions, and health research 
institutions under the Danish regions, among others. Id. § 6(1). 
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contract, as long as the contract does not conflict with the EU rules on State 
aid or EU competition law, which are both discussed in Part VI. 
2. Compensation for Inventors 
In the last several decades there has been heightened interest in what 
right, if any, researchers in university laboratories should have to share in 
the royalties and fees generated by their inventions.204 The EU Commission 
has not addressed this issue, so, as with the ownership of inventions by 
university scientists, the twenty-eight Member States have established 
differing national regimes.205 Unfortunately, these national rules vary 
significantly and can be difficult for a lay person (or, in some cases, even a 
lawyer) to parse. In addition, the rules sometimes result in an allocation of 
IP rights that is not economically efficient given the different utilities 
universities, private firms, and researchers might ascribe to com-
mercialization. The absence of clear default rules also greatly increases 
transaction costs. 
Historically, employee compensation for inventions was awarded in 
certain EU Member States, including the United Kingdom, only in 
“exceptional circumstances.”206 For example, the UK Patents Court 
awarded two inventors at GE Healthcare Limited total compensation of 
approximately €1.5 million in Kelly v. GE Healthcare,207 but only because 
the patent was of outstanding benefit to the employer. Certain experts 
predict that “compensation in the UK is likely to continue to be an 
exception rather than the rule, with only claims regarding particularly 
profitable products having a good chance of success.”208 
However, a university can contract to give its researchers a share of 
royalties and licensing fees. For example, the University of Oxford has “a 
generous revenue-sharing policy” that “brings significant personal benefits 
to researchers.”209 Similarly, Danish patent laws permit the splitting, 
pursuant to contract, of patent licensing revenues between the inventing 
researchers and their institutions.210 
 
 204.  Wolk, supra note 166, at 420. 
 205.  See id. 
 206.  Morag Peberdy & Alain Strowel, Employee’s Rights to Compensation for Inventions—A 
European Perspective, in PLC CROSS-BORDER LIFE SCIENCES HANDBOOK 63, 63 (2009/10). 
 207.  Kelly v. GE Healthcare Ltd., [2009] EWHC (Pat) 181 [207] (Eng.). 
 208.  Peberdy & Strowel, supra note 206, at 66. 
 209.  Research Policies, UNIV. OF OXFORD, http://www.ox.ac.uk/admissions/graduate/applying-to-
oxford/university-policies/research-policies (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 210.  Bekendtgørelse af lov om opfindelser ved offentlige forskningsinstitutioner (Consolidation 
Act. No. 210 on Inventions at Public Research Institutions), Mar. 17, 2009, § 12 (Den.); see also 
Siepmann, supra note 105, at 224. 
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In France, for inventions within the scope of employment, an 
employee-inventor is entitled by statute to remuneration from one to three 
times the employee’s monthly salary, although higher amounts have been 
awarded.211 For example, a court of first instance in Paris awarded a former 
employee of French National Railways (SNCF) more than $750,000 for 
inventing a system that saved SNCF about $22 million a year.212 In another 
French case, the French Supreme Court awarded an employee “additional 
remuneration” of $830,000 for the transfer of intellectual property rights in 
a prostate cancer drug to Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.213 
In Germany, the compensation for employees in the private sector is 
between ten percent and twenty percent of the economic value of the 
invention.214 But different rules apply to the public sector. For example, 
university inventors receive thirty percent of the revenues generated from 
“commercialization” of the invention,215 as do researchers at the Max 
Planck Society,216 a public research organization whose scientists were 
never afforded the “professor’s privilege.”217 
3. University Technology Transfer Offices 
A number of universities in the EU have established technology 
transfer offices to work with researchers and for-profit firms to 
commercialize inventions created in university laboratories. Such offices 
often license patents to for-profit firms. However, an Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report218 revealed wide 
diversity in the structure and organization of technology transfer offices 
within and across the Member States. Variations include on- or off-campus 
offices, arm’s length intermediaries, industry sector-based technology 
transfer offices, and regional technology transfer offices.219 The European 
Technology Transfer Offices circle comprises leading European public 
research organizations that have joined forces “to boost innovation in 
Europe through a set of initiatives, including fostering the use of their 
knowledge portfolio; sharing best practices, knowledge and expertise; 
performing joint activities; establishing informal channels of 
 
 211.  Peberdy & Strowel, supra note 206, at 65. 
 212.  Id. at 63. 
 213.  Id. at 66. 
 214.  Id. at 65. 
 215.  Id. at 68. 
 216.  Buenstorf & Geissler, supra note 16, at 485. 
 217.  Id. at 482. 
 218.  See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEVEL., TURNING SCIENCE INTO BUSINESS: 
PATENTING AND LICENSING AT PUBLIC RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS (2003). 
 219.  Id. at 12. 
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communication with policymakers; organising training programmes; and 
developing a common approach towards international standards for the 
professionalisation of Technology Transfer.”220 
The majority of European university technology transfer offices 
appear to have on-site institutions integrated into the university or research 
institution. For example, Sorbonne University collaborates through 
strategic alliances with industry, and it files approximately twenty patents 
each year. Its intellectual property portfolio, which includes approximately 
450 patents and other sources, generates more than one million euros 
annually in license fees.221 The Sorbonne encourages the creation of spin-
off companies by professors and students and has  established a complete 
range of independent structures to facilitate its technology transfer 
activities. For example, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, one of the 
Sorbonne’s constituent universities,  
 
partners with the government ministry, research organizations, private 
companies, foundations, associations, and laboratories. Research 
cooperation agreements have been set up with leading industrial groups 
through the Research and Technology Transfer Department. This 
department implements the University’s science policy, monitors the 
activities of research and technology transfer, and supports University 
research organizations.222  
 
Humboldt University of Berlin’s policy expressly notes the 
importance of securing patent rights for university inventions: 
 
Safeguarding the rights to inventions is imperative for effective 
marketing. HU aims to ensure that university inventions with the 
potential for wider use are legally protected. Its patent policy places 
equal importance on the bundling of rights and the equal treatment of all 
University members. HU supports the academic quality of its research 
findings by providing optimised patent protection. It also makes the 
general public aware of the quality of its work by filing its own patent 
applications.223 
 
 
 220.  European Technology Transfer Offices Circle, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/tto-circle. 
 221.  PIERRE & MARIE CURIE UNIV., CREATING THE FUTURE WITH SORBONNE UNIVERSITY 14 
(2013), http://www.upmc.fr/modules/resources/download/default/espace_personnels/communication/ 
Communiquer_en_anglais/creating-the-future.pdf. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Knowledge and Technology Transfer, HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITÄT ZU BERLIN (Aug. 12, 2015), 
https://www.hu-berlin.de/en/research/transfer/ueberblick. 
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The Max Planck Society created a separate subsidiary, Max Planck 
Innovation GmbH, in 1970 to patent inventions, license them to domestic 
and foreign firms, and provide support for spin-offs.224 Max Planck 
Innovation applies for patents “if the invention is patentable and considered 
sufficiently promising, even if no licensee for the technology has been 
identified yet.”225 
When the University of Copenhagen and certain other universities226 
in Denmark collaborate with industry, they often insist that the university 
be the legal entity that enters into any agreements with external parties. As 
a result, external partners may not negotiate directly with individual 
researchers, faculties, or departments. Instead, all contracts must be 
negotiated through the University’s Tech Transfer Office. In all its 
agreements, the University of Copenhagen seeks to advance the mission of 
creating and disseminating knowledge by requiring provisions permitting 
its researchers to publish their research results and to use them for research 
purposes. In addition, as discussed further below, the University must 
observe the EU State aid rules. As a result, neither favorable—that is, non-
market—agreements with specific private companies nor the use of public 
funds to favor particular private companies is allowed.227 
 
 224.  Buenstorf & Geissler, supra note 16, at 485. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Other Danish universities that collaborate with industry include, for example, Technical 
University of Denmark, Aarhus University, and Aalborg University. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF 
DEN., START WITH DENMARK: THE HEART OF LIFE SCIENCES FOR RESEARCH AND BUSINESS 39–40 
(2013), http://www.investindk.com/~/media/Files/Sheets/Life%20Sciences/StartWithDenmark_49pp_ 
LOW.ashx. The Inventor’s Guide to Technology Transfer at Aarhus University states: “According to 
the Act on inventions at public research institutions, any inventions made by an employee as part of his 
or her work at a university under the Danish Ministry of Research and Information Technology belongs 
to the institution” and the technology transfer office negotiates licensing agreements “on behalf of the 
university”; the agreements “seek to provide a reasonable return to Aarhus University.” AARHUS 
UNIVERSITET, INVENTOR’S GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT AARHUS UNIVERSITY 13, 18–19 
(2009), http://tto.au.dk/fileadmin/www.tto.au.dk/Dokumenter/inventorsguide.pdf. The technology 
transfer information site for researchers at Aalborg University provides that Aalborg University “as an 
employer” has “the right to acquire all rights to that which the employee has invented in relation” to his 
or her work, and if the technology transfer offices determines the university should acquire the rights to 
the invention, the university will pay patent costs. An inventor may initiate the commercialization 
process himself or herself only when the university does not want to acquire rights to the invention. 
Technology Transfer – Rights and Obligations, AALBORG UNIV., http://www.en.patent.aau.dk/rights-
obligations/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2015). 
 227.  UNIV. OF COPENHAGEN, RESEARCH & INNOVATION: COLLABORATING WITH THE UNIVERSITY 
OF COPENHAGEN - THE UNIVERSITY’S OVERALL PRINCIPLES, 4 (2012), http://fi.ku.dk/english/box/pixi_ 
eng/KU_s_guide_vedr__samarbejdsaftaler_GB_tileksterntweb.pdf/. 
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4. Recent Changes to the EU Patenting Regime 
Academic entrepreneurship in the EU has been hampered by the high 
cost of securing patents in the EU. Figures from 2009 showed that it cost a 
minimum of fifteen times more to patent an invention in each of the 
twenty-seven EU Member States228 than in the United States.229 The high 
cost, which the European Commission called “a tax on innovation,” is 
largely attributable to legal and translation fees.230 
The EU has recently taken a variety of steps to create a faster, cheaper 
patenting system. In 2012, all the Member States except Poland, Spain, and 
Croatia agreed to facilitate uniform patent protection in the EU by adopting 
the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court.231 The Agreement will establish 
a Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) with exclusive and specialized jurisdiction 
over patent cases in all the Member States except Spain, Poland, and 
Croatia, but the Agreement will not go into effect until at least thirteen 
Member States, including France, Germany, and the U.K., ratify it.232 As of 
September 2015, only Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Portugal, and Sweden had ratified the Agreement.233 Also in 2012, 
the EU adopted two related regulations. The first created the Unitary Patent 
(“UP”), a patent based on uniform EU standards that will provide 
protection in all the Member States except Spain and Croatia.234 The 
second established a translation regime for UPs,235 which is expected to 
reduce the translation costs of obtaining a patent from approximately 
 
 228.  As of June 2015 there were twenty-eight Member States. EU Member Countries, EUROPEAN 
UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2015). 
 229.  Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative, supra note 12, at 15. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Council Notice 175/01, Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, 2013 O.J. (C 175) [hereinafter 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court]; EC Taking Stock 2014, supra note 8, at 39. 
 232.  EC Taking Stock 2014, supra note 8, at 39; Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, supra note 
231, art. 84. Croatia has the option of adopting the two regulations and joining the UPC at a later time. 
Id. See also Council Regulation 542/2014, Amending Regulation 12/15/2012 as Regards the Rules to be 
Applied with Respect to the Unified Patent Court and the Benelux Court of Justice, 2014 O.J. (L 163). 
This Regulation shall apply from January 10, 2015. 
 233.  Agreement Ratification Details, EUR. COUNCIL—COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION, http:// 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid= 
2013001 (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). 
 234.  Council Regulation 1257/2012, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the 
Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L 361). This Regulation is effective from January 1, 
2014, or the date of entry into force of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, whichever is the later. 
Id. 
 235.  Id. In accordance with article 7, this Regulation shall apply from January 1, 2014, or the date 
of entry into force of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, whichever is the later. This Regulation 
shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the participating Member States in accordance 
with the Treaties. 
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€23,000 to €700, saving innovative businesses approximately €250 million 
a year.236 Spain and Croatia had not implemented these two regulations as 
of October 2015. Thus, once the UPC Agreement goes into effect, it will be 
possible to obtain an EU patent based on unitary standards in one step. 
The EU is also exploring ways to commercialize unused patented 
technology by forming a market mechanism for its valuation and 
transfer.237 “Technology markets tend to be thin; a few potential licensees 
typically exist for a particular technology and licensing is based on small-
numbers bargaining.”238 Institutions of higher learning and businesses 
started forming Knowledge Alliances in 2014.239 These structured 
partnerships strive to “design and deliver new curricula and courses, to 
develop new and innovative ways of teaching and learning, to facilitate the 
flow of knowledge between higher education and companies, to stimulate 
interdisciplinary activities/learning and to develop entrepreneurial skills 
and attitudes.”240 The “ultimate goal” of Knowledge Alliances is to 
stimulate innovation in and through higher education and to make 
cooperation between higher education and business a “more common 
feature” of the higher education system in the EU.241 
What may prove more challenging is providing the strong IP 
protection necessary to promote commercialization while respecting the 
EU’s longstanding commitment to the public dissemination of publicly 
funded research.242 The European Commission asserted in 2014: 
 
The basis for the development of a more efficient knowledge system that 
protects  intellectual property and investments in knowledge while 
providing the conditions for open collaboration and knowledge sharing 
are in place. This  concerns in particular the Unitary Patent, the 
exploration of knowledge  markets for pa-tents and licences, and the 
transition from . . . the concept of  knowledge transfer to a system based 
on co-creation and open innovation.243 
 
 236.  Press Release, European Comm’n, supra note 2. 
 237.  See Towards Enhanced Patent Valorisation for Growth and Jobs, SWD (2012) 458 final 
(Dec. 21, 2012). 
 238.  Buenstorf & Geissler, supra note 16, at 488. 
 239.  EC Taking Stock 2014, supra note 8, at 18, 90. 
 240.  Id. at 18. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative, supra note 12, at 19 (“The Commission will promote open 
access to the results of publicly funded research.”). 
 243.  EC Taking Stock 2014, supra note 8, at 34. See also EUROPEAN COLLABORATIVE & OPEN 
REG’L INNOVATION STRATEGIES (EURIS), EMBRACING OPEN INNOVATION IN EUROPE: A BEST 
PRACTICES GUIDE ON OPEN INNOVATION POLICIES 11 (2012), http://cars.region-stuttgart.de/sixcms/ 
media.php/923/euris_guide.pdf [hereinafter EURIS] (explaining that “Open Innovation is the practice 
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The Commission noted that while there has been “gradual yet visible 
progress” by most Member States in “putting strategies in place regarding 
access and dissemination of scientific information . . . their approaches 
vary considerably,” with several Member States choosing “soft law rather 
than hard law when implementing [open access].”244 
One organization promoting open access is Top Institute Pharma (“TI 
Pharma”), a self-described “independent research enabler of drug discovery 
and development” based in the Netherlands. 
 
[TI Pharma] sets up and runs multidisciplinary partnerships that advance 
the development of socially valuable medicines. It links precompetitive, 
pharmaceutical research and expertise—from science to industry, from 
the Netherlands and across the globe—in open innovation. TI Pharma 
provides the third-party governance to build and safeguard the trust 
necessary in pharmaceutical partnership.245 
 
Like the European Commission, TI Pharma asserts that “[o]pen 
innovation is the way forward—multidisciplinary collaboration between 
many different stakeholders in pursuit of groundbreaking research. But 
open innovation needs an independent third party that can bring partners 
together —driving R&D towards the medicines we critically need.”246 TI 
Pharma’s partners include small- and medium-sized enterprises, academia 
and knowledge institutes, large industry, and health foundations and patient 
organizations, as well as regulatory authorities and governments.247 
Open innovation or access is, however, a double-edged sword. It 
encourages multidisciplinary and multi-party collaboration, but it also 
increases transaction costs and makes coordination far more difficult than it 
is in a partnership between one pharmaceutical firm and one or more 
research universities. Intermediaries like TI Pharma can help ameliorate 
these costs but cannot eliminate them. Open innovation also obscures the 
 
of looking beyond the four walls of your company—towards suppliers, universities, producers of 
complementary products and services and other firms—to identify and capitalize on new opportunities 
for innovation”). 
 244.  EURIS, supra note 243, at 55. 
 245.  Top Institute Pharma: The Independent Research Enabler, TI PHARMA, http://www.ti 
pharma.com/about-our-institute.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
 246.  Vision, TI PHARMA, http://www.tipharma.com/about-our-institute/vision.html (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2014). 
 247.  See Our Pharmaceutical Research Partners, TI PHARMA, http://www.tipharma.com/ 
partners.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (including partners, for example, Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc., 
Erasmus Medical Center Rotterdam, Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDI), AstraZeneca, the 
Medicines Evaluation Board, and the Netherlands Vaccine Institute). 
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identity of the owner of the inventions created by such consortia. In the 
case of drugs for neglected diseases that cannot be sold at a profit, the 
pharmaceutical companies may be willing to donate their discoveries for 
the common good. But once a drug has demonstrated profit potential, the 
firms that contributed to its development will expect to share in the profits. 
As the Business for Social Responsibility’s Healthcare Working Group 
(whose founding members include the heads of GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson 
& Johnson, Merck, Novartis, and Takeda) stated: 
 
We depend on R&D to promote innovation and we support a variety of 
approaches such as clear patent policies and, when appropriate, 
voluntary licensing and collaborative models to increase access to our 
products. We believe that appropriate intellectual property protection 
enables innovation and creates the necessary conditions to make our 
R&D sustainable and enhance innovations over time.248 
C. Comparative Data on Academic Patenting in the United States and 
Europe 
Francesco Lissoni defines an “academic patent” as “any patent signed 
at least by one academic scientist, while working at his or her 
university.”249 According to the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
maintained by the European Patent Office,250 academic patenting in Europe 
is most concentrated in the field of Pharmaceuticals and Biology, which 
includes cosmetics.251 This “reflects the important role of public science in 
scientific disciplines related to these technologies, and the close 
relationship between scientific discoveries and inventions therein,” both in 
Europe and the United States.252 
In the United States, universities own 68.7% of academic patents, 
companies own 24.2%, individual scientists own 5.3%, and the government 
owns 1.7%.253 In contrast, companies own most academic patents in many 
parts of Europe: 66.5% in Denmark, 61.4% in France, 72% in Italy, 60.5% 
 
 248.  BUS. FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY HEALTHCARE WORKING GRP., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON 
ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE 3 (2013), http://www.bsr.org/pdfs/our-work/working-groups/BSR_HCWG_ 
GPAH.pdf. 
 249.  Francesco Lissoni, Academic Patenting in Europe: An Overview of Recent Research and New 
Perspectives, 34 WORLD PATENT INFO. 197, 198 (2012). 
 250.  See generally EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT), EUROPEAN PATENT 
OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/searching/subscription/raw/product-14-24.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2015). 
 251.  Lissoni, supra note 249, at 199. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. at 201 (compiling data from 1994 to 2002). 
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in the Netherlands, 81.1% in Sweden, and 67.1% in the United Kingdom.254 
As a result, if one counts only patents owned by universities, it would 
appear that “European academic science does not contribute to 
technological advancements or, more prosaically, that it does not patent 
enough.”255 As seen in Table 3, this disparity is reduced or eliminated 
entirely when one compares not only the number of university-owned 
patents in the United States with those owned by universities in Europe 
(which increased from 390 in 1998 to 936 in 2004256), but also compares all 
academic patents in both regions, regardless of whether they are owned by 
universities, individual scientists, or the government.257 
 
Table 3 
 
Country Percentage of Total 
Domestic Patents Owned 
by Universities 
Academic Patents as 
a Percentage of Total 
Domestic Patents 
United States 4.0 6.0 
France 0.3 3.4 
Italy 0.4 4.0 
Netherlands 1.0 4.3 
Sweden 0.3 6.2 
Source:  Francesco Lissoni, Academic Patenting in Europe: An Overview of 
Recent Research and New Perspectives, 34 WORLD PATENT INFO. 197, 201, fig. 3 
(2012). 
 
 
 254.  Id. at 200–01. (“[T]he type of ownership of academic inventions (which may have a 
consequence for whether these inventions are eventually marketed), is affected by at least three 
phenomena: the national IP legislation with respect to academic inventions; the division of labour 
between public research organizations and the universities in the science system; and the characteristics 
of universities in terms of autonomy and expertise in self-administration.”). 
 255.  Id. at 197. 
 256.  Manuel Acosta et al., Production of University Technological Knowledge in European 
Regions: Evidence from Patent Data, 43 REGIONAL STUD. 1167, 1172 (2009); see also id. at 1173 
(showing pharmaceuticals accounted for 39.15% of the 4,580 university-owned European patents 
granted in the period from 1998 to 2004. The regions with the largest number of pharmaceutical patents 
were Inner London, U.K. (11.2%), Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire, U.K. (6.9%), Vlaams 
Gewest, Belgium (5.1%), Zuid-Holland, the Netherlands (4.6%), and Île de France, France (3.8%)). 
 257.  Because companies, not universities, own most academic patents in Europe, a calculation that 
compares university-owned patents in the United States with university-owned patents in Europe 
suggests that European academic scientists are not as productive in generating patentable discoveries. 
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As Lissoni noted in 2012, “[v]ery heated political discussions have 
taken place over the past few years, about whether technology transfer 
detracts from basic research.”258 Citing multiple papers, he states: 
“Overwhelmingly, the evidence suggests that academic inventors are very 
highly productive scientists: a fixed effect exists, by which highly 
productive academic scientists are more likely than less productive ones to 
turn into inventors and, conversely, academic inventors exhibit higher-
than-average scientific productivity.”259 Similarly, Rosa Grimaldi et al. 
report: “Academic research has found little systematic evidence of a 
destruction of the open culture of science or to support the assertion that 
universities are performing less basic research.”260 Instead,  “the published 
evidence suggests that patenting is followed by an increase in scientific 
productivity.”261 
Lissoni also cites what he characterizes as the “well-established result, 
at least for the U.S., . . . that university-owned academic patents appear to 
be more general and important than corporate ones, where importance is 
measured by the number of citations received, and generality by the 
number of technological classes from which the citations come.”262 The 
empirical evidence from Europe is more mixed. Based on their analysis of 
data from the European Patent Office, Emanuele Bacchiocchi and Fabio 
Montobbio found that patents by European and Japanese academic 
institutions and public research organizations were not cited more than 
average.263 But Dirk Czarnitzki, Katrik Hussinger and Cedric Schneider 
found that German academic patents were cited more than the average.264 
Although European academic patents owned by individual inventors are 
cited less frequently than the average patent, “country specificities emerge, 
which can be explained by the different legal and institutional 
environments.”265 European academic patents, particularly those owned by 
universities, public research organizations and governments, are more 
 
 258.  Id. at 202. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Grimaldi et al., supra note 13, at 1046. 
 261.  Lissoni, supra note 249, at 202. 
 262.  Id. at 204. 
 263.  Id. (citing E. Bacchiocchi & F. Montobbio, Knowledge Diffusion from University and Public 
Research: A Comparison Between US, Japan and Europe Using Patent Citations, 34 J. TECH. 
TRANSFER 169, 179–80 (2009)). 
 264.  Id. (citing Dirk Czarnitzki et al., Commercializing Academic Research: The Quality of 
Faculty Patenting, 20 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1403, 1423 (2011)). 
 265.  Id. 
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general than average.266 In addition, “[i]ndividually owned academic 
patents appear to be more original than average.”267 
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS RAISED BY UNIVERSITY 
LICENSING IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Public policy questions are raised when a university patents an 
invention funded by the government and then licenses it to a private 
entity.268 Overly broad licenses from academic institutions to private firms 
can stifle academic discovery and squelch innovation. For example, “reach-
back licenses,” which give the private firm licensee the right to any follow-
on innovations developed by the academic institution, are particularly 
burdensome because they limit researchers’ ability to transfer new 
discoveries to other private firms that might offer better terms or be better 
equipped to commercialize the discoveries. Similarly, if the academic 
institution has no access to the discoveries the private firm makes when 
developing and commercializing the technology, this may hamper further 
work by the academic researchers. 
While many universities have dedicated themselves “to the creation 
and dissemination of knowledge for the public good,”269 the leadership of 
each university “must decide whether and to what extent to embrace 
commercially oriented activities” based upon the respective university’s 
“mission.”270 Certain universities, especially in the United States, “view 
technology transfer as indelibly linked with their social obligations as 
universities.”271 But because “[u]niversities . . . are not in the business of 
developing commercial technologies,” some argue that the private sector is 
better suited to commercializing academic inventions.272 Technology 
transfer can be the link between publicly sponsored research and private-
sector commercialization.273 For example, the mission of M.I.T.’s 
Technology Licensing Office “is to foster commercial investment in the 
development of inventions and discoveries flowing from the research at the 
 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  See generally Jacob H. Rooksby, Myriad Choices: University Patents Under the Sun, 42 J.L. 
& EDUC. 313 (2013). 
 269.  Sara E. Crager et al., University Contributions to the HPV Vaccine and Implications for 
Access to Vaccines in Developing Countries: Addressing Materials and Know-How in University 
Technology Transfer Policy, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 253, 258 (2009). 
 270.  Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational 
Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1566 (2012). 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Id. at 1506. 
 273.  Id. 
 48 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 26:1 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Lincoln Laboratory.”274 M.I.T. 
asserts that “[i]t is through these investments—and the economic 
development and new products that follow from them—that university 
technology provides direct benefits to the public.”275 
But close ties between academic researchers and industry can create 
conflicts of interest,276 result in perverse incentives,277 and force a shift 
from basic to applied research.278 In addition to interfering with the creation 
and transfer of knowledge, licenses to private firms can deprive patients of 
life-saving therapies. “[S]trong resentment and frustration have emerged as 
a result of the licensing and patent policies of universities,” particularly 
when universities grant exclusive licenses to firms that “restrict access to 
essential products in the developing world.”279 Because many licenses give 
 
 274.  MIT Technology Licensing Office, MASS. INST. OF TECH. TECH. LICENSING OFFICE, 
http://web.mit.edu/tlo/www/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
 275.  MASS. INST. OF TECH., AN INVENTOR’S GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT THE 
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (2005), http://tlo.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/ 
MITInventGd_V5%204-7-2010.pdf. 
 276.  See generally Bryan A. Liang & Tim Mackey, Confronting Conflict: Addressing Institutional 
Conflicts of Interest in Academic Medical Centers, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 136 (2010). See also M.I.T. 
POLICIES, supra note 125, § 4.10.2 (explaining that to help ameliorate the conflicts involved when an 
inventor will hold equity or options in a closely held company to which a university invention will be 
licensed, M.I.T. requires prior approval from the Vice President for Research before it will accept 
equity in lieu of cash royalties. Similarly, if the inventor will continue as an M.I.T. employee after 
receiving equity in the licensee, the employee must sign M.I.T.’s Conflict Avoidance Statement.); Katie 
Thomas, Using Doctors With Troubled Pasts to Market a Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2014, at A1 
(noting that conflicts of interest also arise between industry (i.e., pharmaceutical companies) and 
doctors when pharmaceutical companies pay doctors for “speaking fees, travel and meals” to promote 
their products. This can result in a doctor “inappropriately prescribing” a drug company’s products, and 
it has been reported that some drug companies, in their quest to “cultivate relationships” with doctors, 
seek doctors with “troubled track records to market” their products to other doctors. “[D]rug companies 
have paid billions of dollars” in the past few years to “settle federal charges that they inappropriately 
marketed their products, sometimes by providing ‘speaking fees’ in exchange for the doctor’s 
prescribing behavior.” Eric C. Campbell, a Harvard Medical School Professor of Medicine who studies 
these conflicts of interests, said that “[t]his appears to be the business plan. . . . It appears to be, you do 
whatever you have to do, and you know that eventually you will pay fines, but you will pay the fines 
and still make a lot more”). 
 277.  Liang & Mackey, supra note 276, at 156 (noting that “the [academic medical center] can be 
seen as an actor interested in research that can result in patent exclusivity, which in the drug 
development context results in higher costs of pharmaceuticals, with a focus on prioritizing projects 
with immediate marketability . . . [which] undermines the basic tenet of the [academic medical center], 
and the physicians and researchers who work within it, to benefit the public good first”). 
 278.   Id. (noting that “[s]ome have argued that the [lucrative revenue streams produced by these 
arrangements] have led [academic medical centers] to shift away from their primary goal of unfettered 
scientific research, to focus on industry-oriented research and technology transfer incentives, which has 
transformed them into corporate research laboratories, dampening the progression of discovery”). 
 279.  Hafiz Aziz ur Rehman, Equitable Licensing and Publicly Funded Research: A Working 
Model for India?, 16 SW. J. INT’L L. 75, 88 (2010). 
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pharmaceutical firms the right to decide where to file patents, the 
companies “generally file strategic patents in many developing countries to 
minimize the risk of competition from generic drugs.”280 
In response to push-back from a coalition that included the inventor of 
the HIV drug Zerit® the former head of the WHO’s HIV/AIDS program 
and 600 Yale University professors, researchers, and students who signed a 
petition calling on the university to “ease its patent” on Zerit®, Yale 
persuaded its exclusive licensee Bristol-Myers Squibb to enter into an 
“agreement not to sue” with Aspen Pharmacare, the leading generic 
manufacturer in South Africa. As a result, Aspen was able sell the drug in 
South Africa at a fraction of the price charged in developed countries.281 
Notwithstanding their proud history of creating and disseminating 
knowledge to the public, research universities in the EU and regulators may 
have to choose between open access and commercialization, at least for 
certain downstream discoveries. Of course, this is not a binary choice. As 
argued below, open access may be suitable for upstream research data and 
research tools developed in the university laboratory, but not for 
downstream applications of that data or those tools. Indeed, the Union-wide 
Pilot on Open Research Data in Horizon 2020 recognizes these tradeoffs by 
giving parties the ability to opt out “under defined circumstances, including 
conflict with obligations to protect results, with confidentiality obligations, 
with security obligations or with rules on protection of personal data. 
Parties may also opt out if the achievement of the action’s main objective 
would be jeopardised by making specific parts of the research data openly 
accessible.”282 Thus, if the success of a PPPP required keeping research 
data confidential, that would appear to be permissible. 
The public policy issues are particularly acute when a university 
issues an exclusive license on a foundational technology or research tool 
 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  Stevens & Effort, supra note 172, at 87; see also id. at 98 (explaining that Universities Allied 
for Essential Medicines, a student organization that grew out of Amy Kapczynski’s work at Yale with 
Zerit®, “convened” an independent working group that developed the Equitable Access License, which 
is designed to promote the use of university inventions to promote global health by providing “a 
mandatory grantback of all improvements made by the primary licensee to the academic institution, 
which can then license the complete package of intellectual property non-exclusively to third parties 
who wished to make and sell the products in developing countries.” In exchange, the university would 
charge a 5% royalty on sales in Middle Income Countries and a 2% royalty for sales in Low Income 
Countries (as defined by the World Bank) and then split the royalties with the primary licensee. The 
pharmaceutical firms with which they discussed this matter indicated that they would be unwilling to 
license academic inventions pursuant to a license that gave the university a grantback of the inventions 
the private firms generated in the course of developing and commercializing the licensed technology. 
Thus, this approach is unlikely to work for the development of for-profit drugs). 
 282.  EC Taking Stock 2014, supra note 8, at 55. 
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funded by the government to a private for-profit pharmaceutical enterprise. 
For example, Harvard University was criticized for granting the DuPont 
Pharmaceutical Company exclusive rights to the “oncomouse,” a strain of 
transgenic mice created with “a proprietary gene-insertion method called 
Cre-loxP, which enables a researcher to select particular conditions under 
which expression of a transgene may be induced or repressed.”283 DuPont 
demanded that scientists stop sharing data generated by research using the 
mice, submit future scientific journal articles to DuPont for pre-publication 
review, and give DuPont “‘reach-through’ rights to downstream inventions 
arising from the use of transgenic animals created by the Cre-loxP 
method.”284 The director of the NIH and others successfully pressured 
DuPont to relax its restrictions on the use of its transgenic animals and to 
stop demanding reach-through rights and pre-publication review of 
research.285 
Certain universities “have recognized the impact they can have on 
improving access to medicines that originate on their campuses” and view 
themselves as “ideally suited to address the dire needs of the estimated 10 
million people who die each year because they do not have access to 
existing medicines and vaccines.”286 For this reason, universities may be 
willing to forgo some or all license and royalty fee revenue, especially 
when the invention relates to a disease prevalent in developing countries, 
such as malaria or tuberculosis. But other universities have sought to 
maximize the royalty streams available from their research. Particularly at a 
time when available federal grants from the NIH and other funders have 
been sharply reduced, royalty income may be seen as necessary to fund 
further research or other needs, including financial aid for needy students. 
To address concerns about access to life-saving drugs, a group of U.S. 
universities promulgated a statement of “Nine Points to Consider” when 
patenting or licensing pharmaceutical inventions.287 That guidance explains 
that universities should structure licensing agreements in a manner that 
 
 283.  Hoffman, supra note 107, at 1029; see also Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing 
Foreign Law to Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4–5 (2005) 
(noting that the Supreme Court of Canada held that the oncomouse was not patentable subject matter 
because it was a “higher life form,” not an article of “manufacture” or “composition of matter” even 
though the United States, Japan, and the EU had granted Harvard University patents for the transgenic 
mouse). 
 284.  Hoffman, supra note 107, at 1029. 
 285.  Id. at 1029–30. 
 286.  Crager et al., supra note 269, at 258. 
 287.  See generally CAL. INST. OF TECH. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO 
CONSIDER IN LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY (2007), www.otl.stanford.edu/documents/white 
paper-10.pdf. 
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gives “underprivileged populations,” especially those in developing 
countries, no-cost or low-cost access to pharmaceutical innovations.288 
Alternatively, a university may try to license its invention only to a 
pharmaceutical enterprise with similar humanitarian views, under a concept 
termed “socially responsible licensing.”289 Or, a university or private firm 
may seek an NGO (non-governmental organization), such as the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation,290 to pay a fair royalty or licensing fee for drugs 
for patients in developing countries and neglected diseases. 
The NIH has adopted protocols offering guidance on when it is 
appropriate for a research university to patent certain innovations.291 
Although it lacks clear legal authority to do so, the NIH has conditioned 
grants on an applicant’s willingness to forgo seeking broad patents on the 
human genome. As discussed further below, we encourage Congress to 
expressly grant the NIH such power. 
Certain academics argue that exclusive patent licenses are necessary to 
reduce “the perceived risk of investing in unproven technology to attract 
private risk capital.”292 But former Harvard University President Derek Bok 
cautioned that “[z]ealous campus officials can slow commercial 
applications and drive up prices of valuable products by granting exclusive 
patent licenses, where nonexclusive licenses would be feasible, merely to 
let the university share in any monopoly profits that the exclusive licensee 
manages to earn.”293 Patent pools, which are discussed in Part VI.B., can 
help address this issue. 
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EDUCATION 112 (2003). See Rebecca Goulding et al., Alternative Intellectual Property for Genomics 
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VI. CREATING A NEW TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MODEL FOR 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Although the Bayh-Dole Act was initially characterized as 
“innovation’s golden goose,”294 individuals and organizations later 
questioned the influence it actually had on university research.295 There are 
significant advantages to the U.S. approach to commercializing 
government-funded inventions, but we submit that the EU should not enact 
legislation akin to Bayh-Dole without giving universities and public 
funders more discretion regarding (1) when technology must be patented to 
avoid having it revert to the government, (2) who owns the patents, and (3) 
when exclusive licenses are permissible. 
We agree with Liza Vertinsky that “[u]niversities should . . . be 
viewed not simply as ‘engines,’ but rather as guardians of their inventions, 
and the law should be designed to encourage their responsible involvement 
in shaping the post-discovery future of their wards.”296 This would create a 
middle ground between the model of open innovation in the IMI and open 
access in Horizon 2020 on the one hand, and the “anticommons” created by 
the current U.S. system on the other. 
Lissoni’s research makes clear that the research university does not 
necessarily have to own the IP created by its researchers for 
commercialization to occur. 297 The EU should, however, act to promote the 
clear and economically efficient allocation of IP rights to government-
funded academic inventions among the governments providing the funding, 
the private pharmaceutical entities, the public universities, and the 
academic and industrial researchers engaged in PPPPs and other public-
private collaborations.298 The divergent national rules in the Member States 
concerning both the ownership of the IP rights stemming from university 
research and the rights of the individual researchers to a share of the 
royalties generated by their discoveries make it harder and more expensive 
 
 294.  Innovation’s Golden Goose, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2002, available at http://www.eco 
nomist.com /node/1476653. 
 295.  See, e.g., Bayhing for Blood or Doling out Cash?, ECONOMIST (Dec. 20, 2005), http:// 
www.economist.com/node/5327661. 
 296.  Liza Vertinsky, Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1949, 1949 
(2012). 
 297.  See generally Lissoni, supra note 249. 
 298.  See Bart Verspagen, University Research, Intellectual Property Rights and European 
Innovation Systems, 20 J. ECON. SURVEYS 607, 618–20 (2006) (explaining that maximizing the 
likelihood and magnitude of success of a PPPP or other joint research project requires the parties to 
decide who should own the patents resulting from university research – the government, the university, 
or the individual researcher). 
 
 2015 PROMOTING “ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP” 53 
for public and private parties to negotiate and operate efficient PPPPs. The 
European Commission could enhance transparency, reduce transaction 
costs, and promote efficiency by encouraging at least some harmonization 
of the Member States’ laws regarding the ownership of inventions while 
permitting the Member States to choose from a menu of options. We also 
urge the EU to require universities to share at least some of the royalties 
and fees they receive from discoveries funded by public money with the 
individual researchers, or to provide non-financial incentives, such as 
reduced teaching loads, more graduate students, or better equipped 
laboratory space. Finally, we applaud recent steps taken to clarify the 
application of the State aid rules to PPPPs, discussed in Part VI.C, and 
suggest additional safe harbors in Part VI.B.  
A.  Ensuring a Clear and Efficient Allocation of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
1. Harmonization with Flexibility 
The opaque patchwork of national laws allocating IP rights to 
governments or universities and their researchers in the EU impedes 
efficient technology transfer. Clear rules would facilitate the transfer of 
technology from the university research lab to the marketplace, both by 
clarifying ownership of inventions and by offering incentives for 
researchers to collaborate with industry. We assert that the European 
Commission should, as part of its overall restructuring of patent law in the 
EU and in furtherance of the Innovation Union, make harmonization and 
the creation of appropriate incentives a priority. 
Even though achieving Union-wide consensus on the ownership of 
intellectual property will not be easy, we believe that it may not be as 
difficult as it first appears. In practice, by operation of law or pursuant to 
contract, most of the Member States already give an employer the rights to 
an invention created by one of its employees if the invention was created in 
the course of the employee’s normal duties and the invention might 
reasonably have been expected to result from carrying out such duties.299 
The European Commission could clarify ownership rights by establishing a 
default rule to this effect, which would apply unless a Member State 
enacted legislation, taken from a limited menu of options, that clearly 
articulates who owns the discoveries generated by university researchers 
utilizing public funds. Thus, Italy and Sweden could elect to keep their 
current system—giving academic researchers all ownership rights to the 
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inventions—and the U.K. and Germany could maintain their practice of 
giving those rights to the universities unless the universities and their 
researchers agreed otherwise by contract. Rather than incurring the 
transaction costs associated with individual assignments of inventions, 
universities should consider adopting various templates, perhaps through 
the European Technology Transfer Offices circle. That way, researchers 
could factor a university’s technology transfer rules into account when 
deciding where to work, thereby enhancing the efficiency of the labor 
markets in the EU. 
Our proposal would permit the Member States to determine, perhaps 
university by university, the proper balance between a university’s role in 
promoting the free flow of information and its need to both raise money to 
fund future research and to give private industry partners a financial 
incentive to commercialize promising discoveries. Thus, certain inventions, 
especially those funded exclusively with government money, might be 
public goods available to anyone; others could be proprietary to promote 
commercialization. Compare, for example, the University of Copenhagen 
technology transfer policy with the policy at the University of Oxford. On 
the one hand, the University of Copenhagen states that it “places great 
importance on its collaborative relations with external partners and . . . 
strive[s] to enter collaboration agreements as fast and as smoothly as 
possible. In this process, the University focuses more on the transfer of 
knowledge and less on financial return.”300 Other institutions, including 
Oxford, focus more on financial return for the university and, in certain 
institutions, the researchers themselves. Oxford’s policy states: 
 
Oxford’s approach to exploitation of IP includes a generous revenue-
sharing policy, which brings significant personal benefits to researchers, 
and a hugely successful and well-resourced technology transfer 
operation, Isis Innovation. Isis works with University researchers on 
identifying, protecting and marketing technologies through licensing, 
spin-out company formation, consulting and material sales.301 
 
For the reasons set forth immediately below, we also encourage the 
EU to adopt a default rule providing that academic researchers and their 
research units (e.g., their departments) are entitled to receive specified 
percentages of the net revenues received by their university as a result of 
their inventions. The Member States (or, pursuant to legislation adopted by 
a Member State, the universities in that State) might be given a range 
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within which they could increase or decrease those default percentages, 
depending upon their own societal values. At a minimum, each university 
should be required to specify the share of royalties (or at least the minimum 
percentage of royalties) payable to the academic inventors for licensed 
inventions and patents and the equity guaranteed an inventor in the case of 
a spin-off of university technology. 
2. Understanding the Differing Utility Functions of Three Dyads in the 
EU 
Ensuring an efficient allocation of IP rights requires that policy 
makers, universities, and private actors analyze the varying interests of 
three dyads involved in the funding and conduct of pharmaceutical research 
in the EU: (1) the EU and the Member State, (2) the Member State and the 
university or industrial firm, and (3) the university and its industrial partner 
and the research scientists. The EU funds partnership research among 
universities and the private pharmaceutical sector through Innovative 
Medicines Initiative (“IMI”) grants. The Member States fund research at 
the university level, and universities, in turn, fund research scientists and 
their departments. Because the players have different utility functions,302 
their disparate and joint interests must be taken into account when 
allocating IP rights by law or private contract. 
a. The EU and the Member State 
The EU’s bold plans for an Innovation Union include the development 
of new healthcare technology and pharmaceutical products that will both 
make the EU more competitive in the global marketplace and provide 
better medical outcomes for individuals living in the Member States. The 
European Commission stated that collaboration between public universities 
and the private pharmaceutical sector is important to the success of the IMI, 
and it recommended greater use of PPPPs to achieve this objective.303 
Aside from wanting to diversify the inputs for innovation and to 
allocate the rewards in a fair manner to ensure political, social, and 
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economic stability, the EU should remain agnostic as to which Member 
State generates the next blockbuster drug. Rather than picking national 
champions, the EU should direct human and financial capital to those 
parties most likely to develop the most significant discoveries at the lowest 
cost. That is a basic premise of the IMI model, which seeks competing bids 
in response to calls for proposals. 
The Member States compete with each other to garner the largest “IMI 
market share.” If a given Member State’s universities do not win the 
competition for limited public and private funding, the Member State will 
lose valuable opportunities to innovate, provide new jobs, and grow. In this 
respect, the interests of the EU and the Member States are similar and can 
be described as a growth agenda that can be accomplished through properly 
crafted PPPP contracts and the efficient allocation of IP rights. But the 
individual Member States might be tempted to “put a thumb on the scales” 
to give their own national firms the right to technology developed by their 
universities with public funds at lower-than-EU market rates. As long as 
the Member States can introduce national legislation that conflicts with the 
EU objectives, the future of PPPPs in the EU is problematic. This danger 
can be addressed through both the efficient allocation of intellectual 
property rights and the proper implementation of the State aid rules. 
When crafting the rules allocating IP rights, it is critical for policy 
makers to keep in mind that the various participants in a PPPP may have 
different utility functions, which will determine which choices they deem 
rational.304 If a party’s share of the returns from the IP resulting from a 
PPPP is too low, it might not collaborate and the contract will fail to meet 
the parties’ objectives. 
A French study compared traditional contracting schemes and 
licensing allocations with the terms of PPPPs305 based on the European 
public-private partnership initiative between European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industry and Associations (“EFPIA”) and the European 
Commission (DG Research – health priority) that resulted in the IMI. The 
study was designed to establish a model for PPPPs that would promote 
growth and innovation through an alternative model of collaboration while, 
at the same time, ensuring a balance between academic and industry 
interests in discovering and developing innovative drugs for the benefit of 
all stakeholders, including consumers.306 The study concluded that the back 
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offices in both the public and the private sector must be educated about the 
aims and objectives involved in negotiating, signing, executing, operating, 
and finalizing a PPPP collaboration. In particular, the study found that 
establishing the basis for a common culture on project management and 
intellectual property and promoting trans-disciplinary profiles, requires: 
 
training personnel (including not just researchers, but also public 
administrative staff) in project management to ensure fulfillment of 
contract objectives, adherence to timelines, quality assurance, and the 
on-time production of all deliverables; 
mobility between the public and the private sector; and 
specialized training in translational medicine or pharmaceutical medicine 
covering target and drug discovery, preclinical develop-ment, clinical 
trials, and management.307 
 
At a minimum, therefore, the European Commission should issue 
guidance to help ensure that the back offices of both the private and public 
parties to a PPPP understand the importance of allocating the IP rights 
efficiently in their IMI or other contracts. Given the importance of the IMI 
to the Innovation Union, the absence of such guidance in the IMI is 
particularly problematic. Because the allocation will affect the likelihood of 
success, we further recommend that bidders be required to include their 
proposed PPPP contract with their bid for IMI funds. 
b. The Member State and the University or Industrial Firm 
Each Member State should seek to foster closer collaboration between 
its academic institutions and industry participants to attract investment 
without either sacrificing the public good created by the academy and its 
members or violating local cultural norms. Public universities should be 
able to receive grants from the Member State to perform basic scientific 
research and, at the same time, collaborate with industrial firms to generate 
revenues that can be plowed back into the university to fund further 
research or meet other needs. But universities and pharmaceutical 
companies have different drivers and underlying motivations. As discussed 
above, private pharma-ceutical companies  generally  seek to  maximize 
shareholder wealth,308 while universities focus primarily on research and 
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the creation and dissemination of knowledge. Thus, the university must 
ensure that commercialization of its publicly funded science does not 
unduly restrict use of basic scientific discoveries. At the same time, it must 
offer sufficient incentives to persuade private firms to fund and 
commercialize academic discoveries. 
The Member States should develop competencies and dynamic 
capabilities, including national PPPP platforms, to help industry 
participants and universities successfully respond to IMI calls.309 In order 
to enhance innovative competencies, both in academia and industry, the 
Member States must help develop knowledge networks and innovation 
clusters of the sort that gave birth to the Silicon Valley in the United States. 
They should also facilitate transparency and the sharing of information so 
that transactions are priced properly, build up national infrastructures (by 
funding basic research, for example, or providing scholarship funds for 
aspiring scientists), and promote knowledge management and education. 
Additionally, like the European Commission, the Member States should 
ensure that national applicants for IMI funds allocate the IP rights in the 
most efficient way. 
c. The University and Its Industrial Partner and the Research Scientists 
If structured properly, the relationships between a university and its 
industrial partners can provide unique competitive advantages at both the 
university and industry levels.310 Game theory can explain the 
interdependence among the contracting parties to a PPPP,311 as well as the 
parties affected by the PPPP, such as individual academic and industry 
researchers. It can also suggest the possible outcomes of various choices 
and, thereby, assist negotiators in better predicting how contractual 
provisions are likely to affect the strategy the other party might choose. 
The efficient equilibrium for the allocation of IP rights depends, at 
least in part, on the ex ante bargaining power of the parties.312 “R&D 
expenditures [by a pharmaceutical firm] are strategic and rational if they 
are chosen to maximize the profit from developing a new drug,”  given the 
firm’s inferences concerning “the competition’s commitment to this line of 
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drug.”313 Ex ante, a university researcher is often unable, due to a lack of 
capital and know-how, to negotiate effectively with a private company for 
the transfer of ownership, even when such a transfer would create the 
highest total surplus.314 Thus, it can be argued that the university researcher 
should not hold the IP rights in the first place; instead, the IP rights would 
be more efficiently placed with the university, which holds more capital 
and has greater bargaining power ex ante. This is the economic foundation 
of Bayh-Dole. 
But the utility attainable from a discovery is not always transferable in 
ex ante bargaining over IP rights between a university and a private 
pharmaceutical company. Without the academic’s active involvement, most 
attempts to commercialize are far more likely to fail.315 In addition, the 
private ownership of patents by university researchers might lead to a 
situation in which the individual inventors (if they own the IP rights to their 
discoveries) can easily transfer them to the private industrial firms that 
have the capital and other resources to commercialize them. 316 As Lissoni 
found, this already happens frequently in Europe.317 “Giving property 
rights to the research unit is optimal when it is more important to encourage 
the unit’s effort to discover than to boost the customer’s financial (and 
nonfinancial) investment in the research.”318 That reasoning underlies the 
professor’s privilege.319 
Research by a PPPP is usually conducted by researchers in both 
private companies and universities. The privately employed researcher is 
assumed to be appropriately compensated for acting as directed by the 
employer.  So, absent shirking, the industrial researcher’s objectives will be 
closely aligned with those of its employer. In contrast, the rewards and 
costs associated with discovery and commercialization for the academic 
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researcher may differ from those of the employing university. Thus, when 
deciding how to allocate the financial rewards derived from university 
scientists’ inventions, it is important for both public policy makers and 
individual institutions to consider academic researchers’ utility function to 
ensure an appropriate pay-off. 
Many academic researchers are driven less by purely monetary 
rewards like shared royalties than by a desire to create and disseminate 
knowledge, to improve their own academic research skills, to increase their 
research capacity, and to ensure their own advancement in the academy.320 
These goals are best served by hiring the best research associates, graduate 
students, and postdocs; having access to the latest equipment and other 
laboratory facilities, as well as the most current data and biologic materials, 
such as cell lines; being the first to publish innovative and impactful 
research findings; and having the opportunity to interact with and present 
their findings to leaders in their field. Given that the university owns or at 
least controls the IP rights to university inventions in most Member States, 
an academic researcher will be less inclined to collaborate with industry 
unless there is an incentive (or at least no disincentive) to do so. Because an 
academic researcher’s utility decreases if the cost of participating in a PPPP 
or another collaborative arrangement is not offset by the benefits, public-
private partnerships and other academic-commercial collaborative 
arrangements require “specialised managers in charge of the operational 
management” as well as administrative procedures that “facilitate 
contracts” and “optimize intellectual property rights, balancing [not only] 
industry (patenting) and scientific interest (publishing),”321 but also, in the 
case of the EU, the public and economic interests of the Member State in 
which the university and its researchers are located and those of the 
European Union as a whole. In addition, university technology transfer 
offices should be as easy to navigate and user-friendly as possible so that 
academic researchers do not have to waste valuable research time coming 
to terms with them. 
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The textbook game illustrated below, called the “Odd Couple,”322 
shows how two parties with different utility and investment profiles will 
settle an argument about who should devote more resources to a given 
task.323  
 B =3 hours   B = 6 hours 
A = 6 hours -4,-1 4, -1 
A = 9 hours 1, 2 1, -1  
 
Persons A and B live in the same apartment, but they place different value 
on having a clean place to live.324  The game assumes that it takes twelve 
hours to clean the apartment per week and that each player could spend  
three, six, or nine hours on weekly cleaning.325 As seen in the table, if 
Person A derives the greatest utility from a clean apartment, then (1, 2) is 
the equilibrium and solution of the game—that is, Person A will spend nine 
hours cleaning and Person B will spend three. The dominant strategy for 
two players with different utility functions is, thus, for the party with the 
highest utility to invest more, even when a disproportionate share of the 
benefits accrues to the other party. 
In this article, we assume that the pharmaceutical company (or the EU 
or the Member State) will act similarly to Person A because its payoff from 
commercialization is larger than that of the university researcher (Person 
B). In many of the Member States, the employer owns any invention made 
in the course of the employee’s normal duties, and the employee is only 
compensated in exceptional circumstances. Yet, the savvy commercial 
partner realizes that it needs the active involvement of the academic 
researcher to commercialize most inventions. Similarly, it is important for 
policy makers at both the Member State and the EU level to appreciate the 
fact that neither the current applicable law nor the IMI contracting process 
ensures that academic researchers are adequately compensated financially 
and academically. As noted earlier, it is optimal to give the IP rights to the 
academic researcher “when it is more important to encourage the unit’s 
effort to discover than to boost the customer’s financial (and nonfinancial) 
investment in the research.”326 
Thus, for example, the University of Copenhagen’s strategy of 
“focus[ing] more on the transfer of knowledge and less on financial return 
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[to the university]”327 is problematic if the government of Denmark wants 
to grow Denmark’s translational medicine capabilities. Because the 
University of Copenhagen’s researchers receive neither financial 
compensation nor non-financial incentives, such as greater prestige or 
access to better students, they will be less likely to participate efficiently in 
commercialization. If, however, policymakers in Denmark conclude that it 
is more important for its universities to create common goods in 
furtherance of open access than to commercialize inventions, the 
University’s strategy is sensible. 
In contrast with the University of Copenhagen, a number of 
universities promote commercialization by giving incentives to researchers 
who develop patentable inventions. For example, Humboldt University  
provides “optimised patent protection” and “equal treatment of all 
University members.”328 The Sorbonne “encourages faculty and students to 
create spin-off companies and has recently established a complete range of 
independent structures to facilitate its technology transfer activities.”329 
Finally, Oxford University ensures significant personal benefits to 
researchers by identifying, protecting, and marketing technologies through 
licensing, spin-out company formation, consulting, and material sales, 
thereby promoting the creation of economically efficient PPPPs.330 
In addition, certain universities promote closer academic-industrial 
partnerships and spin-offs by giving tenured professors some period of 
time—up to two years—during which they can work full-time on a 
commercialization project without losing the right to return to their tenured 
academic position. This both enhances the researcher’s opportunity to share 
in the financial success of the venture and reduces his or her opportunity 
cost if the venture fails. 
B. Navigating the “Anticommons” 
An “anticommons”331 exists whenever “property rights cannot be 
aggregated efficiently to create, for example, effective methods for 
assembling and screening new molecules or to realize the ambitions of 
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personalized medicine, which would require whole-genome sequencing.”332 
The anticommons is particularly problematic because it affects the public 
availability of research tools and upstream research related to emerging 
areas, such as pharmacogenomics333 and microbiotics. As Heller and 
Eisenberg explain: “Each upstream patent allows its owner to set up 
another tollbooth on the road to product development, adding to the cost 
and slowing the pace of . . . innovation.”334 
Certain empirical studies suggest that patents have not been as much 
of an impediment to upstream academic research as originally theorized, 
but this appears due in large part to the fact that “scientists typically ignore 
patents, and that for the most part, they get away with it.”335 For example, 
respondents in a study of twenty-five German institutions, including large 
pharmaceutical firms, small- and medium-sized biotechnology firms, 
biotechnology research institutions, and clinical institutions associated with 
universities doing R&D in genetic engineering, “indicated that patents on 
research tools were infringed ‘behind locked laboratory doors,’ that 
patentees were generally unaware of such infringements, and that scientists 
might not be aware of the legal implications of making or using patented 
research tools.”336 Manufacturers of generic drugs in the United States do 
not have that option because the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act)337 requires them to certify to the Food and Drug Administration that 
the generic product does not violate any valid patent.338 
David C. Hoffman articulated a three-prong strategy for dealing with 
the anticommons created by “patent thickets”339 and “patent stacking” in 
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the biotechnology space.340 First, create a broad experimental use 
exemption for public sector researchers.341 Second, establish a compulsory 
licensing regime for certain materials and tools. Third, limit the scope of 
biotechnological patents by requiring a more complete “enabling 
description” of the claimed invention. We encourage regulators in both the 
EU and the United States to consider these recommendations along with 
several other variations on the current Bayh-Dole regime. 
1. Create a Broad Experimental Use Exemption 
The broad experimental use exemption for public sector researchers 
Hoffman calls for “would cover noncommercial use of any biological 
material, reagent, or research tool for which an equivalent substitute is not 
readily available.”342 Such an exemption would legitimize what already 
happens behind many laboratory doors,343 giving researchers an above-
board method for securing the rights they need for basic research, and, 
thereby, eliminating the current perceived need to cheat. 
2. Establish a Compulsory Licensing Regime and Provide a Safe 
Harbor for Patent Pools 
We recommend that universities in the EU continue to be precluded 
from granting exclusive licenses for upstream inventions and research tools 
funded by the government. This avoids the Harvard oncomouse situation, 
described in Part V. If a university patents government-funded upstream 
inventions and research tools, it should be required either to grant 
nonexclusive licenses or to create a collaborative regime, managed by a 
trusted intermediary, that is open to all at a commercially reasonable rate. 
As a possible model for broadly applicable technologies, Hoffman 
cites the terms under which Stanford University and the University of 
California licensed the foundational Cohen-Boyer patents on basic 
recombinant DNA technology, the most lucrative inventions ever created in 
university laboratories.344 These universities widely and nonexclusively 
licensed the technology to public sector researchers, required institutional 
users to pay “a nominal annual fee for a license covering every researcher 
at a particular campus or research facility,” and then assessed reach-
 
 340.  Hoffman, supra note 107, at 1036. 
 341.  Id. at 1036–37. 
 342.  Id. at 1036–37. Similarly, Jennifer Vogel proposed a statutory research exemption for non-
commercial research utilizing patented genes. Jennifer Vogel, Comment, Patenting DNA: Balancing the 
Need to Incentivize Innovation in Biotechnology with the Need to Make High-Quality Genetic Testing 
Accessible to Patients, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 257, 292 (2012). 
 343.  Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 331, at 1064–65. 
 344.  Hoffman, supra note 107, at 1040–41. 
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through royalties (which were modest), but only for products that came to 
market.345 
In addition, as Hoffman suggests, the government could create a 
collective rights organization (CRO) to license “essential reagents and 
research tools” invented in government- or publicly-funded university 
laboratories. Hoffman proposed a U.S. CRO comprised of representatives 
from the NIH, the National Science Foundation, the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization, and public academic research institutions.346 
Meanwhile, representatives of analogous organizations in the EU could 
comprise a comparable CRO there. 
Patent pools “allow innovators to share value and cost to encourage 
free exchange of information and set technology standards” and are often 
used in the semiconductor, aerospace, and entertainment industries.347 They 
can promote the sharing of scientific information and the commer-
cialization of academic discoveries as long as there is proper regard for 
preserving competition in innovation markets.348 As the European 
Commission noted, “collaborative IPR [intellectual property right] 
arrangements (cross-licensing, patent pools, etc.) generally have a positive 
impact, [but] they also need to be examined to ensure they are not used 
anti-competitively.”349 
These concerns are ameliorated when the pool grants a license to all 
participants on a non-discriminatory, nonexclusive basis at a commercially 
reasonable royalty rate.350 In contrast, a patent pool limited to particular 
firms that compete at the same level of distribution would be an 
 
 345.  Id. at 1040. 
 346.  Id. at 1039–40. 
 347.  Moses III et al., supra note 50, at 187 (citing Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Intellectual Property, 
A Better Route to Tech Standards, 343 SCIENCE 972, 972–73 (2014)). “Many [patent] pools simply 
divide royalties in proportion to the number of patents that each firm has contributed to the pool”; this 
can result in patents that were “initially different in their importance [being] made equally essential by 
standardization” thereby “over-reward[ing] minor innovations at the expense of major ones.” Aghion & 
Tirole, supra note 312, at 972. The use of a trusted third-party intermediary to allocate royalties can 
help avoid such an outcome. 
 348.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS 
AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.32(c) (2000). “An innovation market consists of the research and 
development directed to particular new or improved goods or processes and the close substitutes for that 
research and development.” Id. 
 349.  Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative, supra note 12, at 19. 
 350.  See generally David B. Resnik, A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come?, 3 J. PHIL., SCI. & L. 1 (2003). As Rai et al. explain, “In recent years, the pooling of patents 
around information technology standards has become quite common.” Rai et al., supra note 62, at 26 
n.97 (citing Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard 
Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOLUME 1, 119, 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 
2000)). 
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unreasonable restraint on trade under U.S. antitrust law351 and an abuse of           
dominant position under EU competition law.352 As Arti Rai and her 
coauthors have noted: 
 
In practice, the overriding focus in most [U.S.] cases is . . . whether the 
collaboration is likely to accelerate or slow the pace at which R&D 
efforts are pursued. The agencies specifically re-cognize that “[t]hrough 
the combination of complementary assets, technology, or know-how, an 
R&D collaboration may enable participants  more quickly or more 
efficiently to research and develop new or improved  goods.”353 
 
Given the uncertainty under even the more lenient U.S. antitrust 
standards, we agree with Professor Rai and her colleagues that any 
horizontal collaboration should be first vetted by the relevant 
antitrust/competition law authorities. By providing at least some guidance 
in advance, regulators in both the EU and the United States could reduce 
transaction costs, thereby facilitating the creation of patent pools that 
contribute to innovation without unduly hampering competition. 
A possible model is the Predictive Safety Testing Consortium (PSTC), 
managed by Critical Path, a trusted non-profit intermediary created by the 
FDA and major pharmaceutical firms. PSTC facilitates multi-firm 
collaboration on methods to predict and test drug safety.354 Critical Path 
 
collects membership fees from pharmaceutical firm participants, 
coordinates the selection of research projects, and (with the assistance of 
an advisory committee composed of Critical Path and pharmaceutical 
firm representatives) manages the flow of any confidential information. 
If the PSTC advisory committee deems it appropriate to seek patents on 
technology generated by the consortium, Critical Path will own the 
patent rights.355 
 
The objective of PSTC is “broad public dissemination of the results of the 
research and development projects” undertaken by the Consortium. 
 
 351.  See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945). 
 352.  See Commission Notice 11/01, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-Operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11). See 
generally John T. Lang, Eight Important Questions on Standards Under European Competition Law, 7 
COMPETITION L. INT’L 32 (2011); Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE 
J. REG. 359 (1999). 
 353.  Rai et al., supra note 62, at 35 (quoting DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.31(a) (2000)). 
 354.  Id. at 17. 
 355.  Id. 
 2015 PROMOTING “ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP” 67 
Accordingly, “Critical Path is obligated to license any patents it may own 
to all comers on commercially reasonable terms.”356 
Another possible model is the Biomarkers Consortium, which 
promotes multi-firm research on biomarkers of drug efficacy and safety.357 
Unlike Critical Path, the Biomarkers Consortium does not itself retain any 
intellectual property rights; instead, ownership is defined by the policies 
followed by the inventor’s employer.358 However, all participants in the 
Consortium that have an ownership interest in the new data and inventions 
arising out of a Consortium project must grant a “non-exclusive, 
remuneration-free license” to all of the other participants.359 Although this 
model may appeal to for-profit firms, it poses greater competition risks. 
3. Require More Complete Enabling Descriptions 
The EU already gives less exclusive patent protection for 
biotechnology inventions than the United States, thereby avoiding some of 
the anticommons problems inherent in the U.S. regime.360 For example, the 
European Directive on Biotechnology,361 which all of the Member States 
implemented by 2006,362 treats DNA patents “as information products, 
whose eligibility tests should turn on the quality and industrial applicability 
of the information revealed.”363 As a result, the European Patent Office 
requires DNA patent applications to set forth the “industrial applicability of 
the information revealed.”364 We agree with Hoffman that the United States 
should also require biotechnology inventors to set forth in  the “enablement 
 
 356.  Id. 
 357.  Id. at 18. 
 358.  Id. 
 359.  Id. at 18–19 (quoting FOUND. FOR THE NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, THE BIOMARKERS 
CONSORTIUM: GENERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DATA SHARING PRINCIPLES 5 (2006), http:// 
biomarkersconsortium.org/pdf/IP_Policies.pdf). 
 360.  Hoffman, supra note 107, at 1030. 
 361.  Council Directive 98/44 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13. See generally Rob J. Aerts, The 
Industrial Applicability and Utility Requirements for the Patenting of Genomic Inventions, A 
Comparison between European and US Law, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 349 (2004). 
 362.  See EUROPEAN COMM’N, STATE OF PLAY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 98/44/EC 
(2007), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/invent/state-of-play_en.pdf. 
 363.  Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 103, at 117; see also id. at 99 n.64 (citing the Convention 
on the Grant of European Patents arts. 52–53, 57, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255 (requiring that an 
invention have an “industrial application,” i.e., the ability to be used in any kind of industry, to be 
patent eligible)). 
 364.  Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 103, at 117. 
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description”  in the specification for the claimed invention  an “inventive 
concept or principle whose precise contours are defined by the claims.”365 
4. Promote Open Innovation Collaborations 
Certain public-private projects, especially those involving the 
collection of large digital data sets (so-called Big Data), are particularly 
well-suited to open innovation arrangements. For example, the SNP 
Consortium is a non-profit foundation established by the Wellcome Trust, 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms, and academic research centers 
with the objective of publishing “a high-density SNP map of the human 
genome.”366 The Consortium has amassed a database of more than 3.1 
million SNPs.367 A SNP, pronounced “snip,” is a single nucleotide 
polymorphism, that is, “a difference in a single DNA building block, called 
a nucleotide.”368 SNPs “are the most common type of genetic variation 
among people. . . . For example, a SNP may replace the nucleotide cytosine 
(C) with the nucleotide thymine (T) in a certain stretch of DNA. . . . 
[T]here are roughly 10 million SNPs in the human genome.”369 As the NIH 
explained, SNPs “may help predict an individual’s response to certain 
drugs, susceptibility to environmental factors such as toxins, and risk of 
developing particular diseases.”370 
Merck & Co. and Washington University have created the Merck 
Gene Index, “a public database of gene sequences corresponding to human 
genes” designed “to preserve open access to knowledge that could aid in 
drug discovery.”371 Ironically, had this research been funded with federal 
money, then Washington University could not have put the invention in the 
public domain—thereby precluding anyone from patenting it—because title 
to the inventions would have reverted to the U.S. government. 
 
 365.  Hoffman, supra note 107, at 1041–42 (quoting Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On 
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 846 (1990)). 
 366.  Koch, supra note 22, at 279 (quoting Celia M. Henry, Pharmacogenomics, CHEMICAL & 
ENGINEERING NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 37, 39). 
 367.  Id. 
 368.  What Are Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs)?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Nov. 23, 
2015), http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/genomicresearch/snp. 
 369.  Id. 
 370.  Id. 
 371.  Vertinsky, supra note 296, at 1991. The Merck Gene Index has been described “as an 
example of efforts to preempt patent rights and protect the public domain for inputs into drug discovery 
and development.” Id. at 1991 n.168 (citing Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 188–89 (2004)). 
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5. Other Recommended Changes to the Bayh-Dole Regime 
We submit that the current Bayh-Dole regime, which forces a 
university to patent an invention or lose its rights, is ill-suited to the 
development—in both the United States and the EU—of biomedical drugs 
tailored to individual genomes and other types of translational medicine. At 
least for upstream inventions and research tools, we argue that universities 
should have the option of promptly publishing these inventions, thereby 
precluding anyone from obtaining a patent on them.372 IBM and other 
software and hardware firms have for a number of years put certain 
inventions in the public domain in this fashion.373 In addition, Red Hat and 
other “open source” software companies374 have created outlets for 
publishing prior art, which helps prevent the erroneous patenting of 
existing technology and the creation of “patent thickets” that unduly inhibit 
future discoveries. 
We also support the European analogue to the recommendation that 
Congress amend Bayh-Dole to give the NIH, instead of the Commerce 
Department, the power to dictate, as part of the grant application process 
itself, the grantee’s right to patent the funded work and to exclusively 
license it.375 This would not, of course, preclude a private firm from 
funding a line of research with high economic potential, so there would be 
a market check on the funding agency’s conditions. Thus, to the extent that 
biotech firms and large pharmaceutical firms develop pharmacogenetic test 
kits and other innovations without using government-funded research, they 
would be able to patent those inventions without a duty to grant licenses to 
other private firms. 
 
 372.  Vertinsky, supra note 296, at 2002 (recommending that “[t]he university’s right to elect title 
should instead be based on a requirement to engage in reasonable efforts to support the public 
utilization of the invention, with patenting considered as one alternative strategy”). 
 373.  Fully Tested Public Domain Software Now Available for IBM, 6 INFO. TODAY 48, 48 (May 
1989) (noting that public domain software is available for IBM and Apple computers). 
 374.  As Kapczynski and her coauthors noted, “The emergence of free and open source software 
development has led to increased interest in defining the conditions for sustainable and successful 
nonproprietary production strategies—for software and more generally for networked information 
production and some classes of physical resources. These approaches . . . frequently rely upon 
innovative contractual provisions to create a self-perpetuating commons.” Kapczynski et al., supra note 
339, at 1040. With regard to open source copyright licensing, see generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, 
Enforcement of Open Source Software Licenses: The MDY Trio’s Inconvenient Complications, 14 
YALE J. L. & TECH. 106, 111–16 (2011); Dennis M. Kennedy, A Primer on Open Source Licensing 
Legal Issues: Copyright, Copyleft and Copyfuture, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 345 (2001). 
 375.  Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291, 313–14 (2003) (recommending that the NIH and other government 
agencies be given greater authority to limit the patenting of certain publicly funded research). 
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Given the devastating effect of budget cuts on basic research funding 
in the United States376 and the EU,377 it may be appropriate to give the NIH 
in the United States, and an analogous institution in the EU, the right to 
receive a small percentage of the royalties generated by government-funded 
inventions or, in the EU, government- or IMI-funded inventions, that are 
ultimately commercialized. This is tricky, however, because it is important 
not to to unduly restrict funding for the type of research the private markets 
are most unlikely to fund: basic research. Thus, the government should 
limit the percentage of publicly-funded grants eligible for royalty recovery. 
C.  Complying with the EU State Aid Restrictions 
Another possible impediment to commercializing government-funded 
inventions in the EU is uncertainty regarding the application to PPPPs of 
the restriction in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“TFEU”) on the use of State aid to favor a particular 
private enterprise. Article 107(1) provides: 
 
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts 
 
 376.  “Spending on basic research has fallen” with the director of the NIH, Dr. Francis S. Collins, 
calling “2013 one of his agency’s darkest years” and characterizing the cutbacks as “profoundly 
discouraging.” William J. Broad, Billionaires with Big Ideas Are Privatizing American Science, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2014, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/science/billionaires-with-big-ideas-
are-privatizing-american-science.html?_r=1. One concern with reduced federal funding (and the current 
trend of increased private funding) is that the “social contract that cultivates science for the common 
good” is at risk, as the philanthropic funds “tend to enrich elite universities at the expense of poor ones, 
while undermining political support for federally sponsored research and its efforts to foster a greater 
diversity of opportunity . . . among the nation’s scientific investigators.” Id. Another concern is that 
privately funded research tends to focus on illnesses that “predominantly afflict white people,” thus 
expanding the unequal gap that exists in disease research along economic and racial lines. Id. The effect 
of private funds on American research has not been quantified, but the National Science Foundation 
“recently announced plans to begin surveying the philanthropic landscape.” Id. 
 377.  See Editorial, Science Funding: Championing Research in Tough Times, 14 NATURE CELL 
BIOLOGY 439, 439 (May 2012), http://www.nature.com/ncb/journal/v14/n5/pdf/ncb2499.pdf 
(“[S]ubstantial cuts in fiscal spending” have been “triggered by the global economic crisis, 
highlight[ing] a pressing need to safeguard funding to ensure the future health of the scientific research 
enterprise.” The article stated that science spending had been “frozen” in the U.K., with “government 
R&D expenditure failing to match that of other developed countries,” and that reduced endowments to 
certain UK research centers had resulted in cuts to basic research funding. The Horizon 2020 venture 
and its focus on research was referred to as a “step[] in the right direction.”). Cuts have also been made 
to science budgets at European universities. “Since 2009, Italy has seen the recruitment of scientists fall 
by 90% and the amount spent on basic research drop to nothing,” and in Spain, the amount spent on 
“civilian research and development has dropped by 40%” with less than 10% of researchers who retire 
being replaced. Karen MacGregor, Scientists Protest Cuts, Study Shows HE [Higher Education] 
Funding Divide, UNIV. WORLD NEWS (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.universityworldnews.com/ 
article.php?story= 20141010105248818. 
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or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.378 
 
Thus, State aid that distorts or threatens to distort competition is prohibited 
insofar as it affects trade between Member States. 
 State aid control is an integral part of EU competition policy and a 
necessary safeguard that preserves effective competition and free trade in 
the single market. Absent this control, Member States could use State aid 
strategically to promote national economic interests without regard for 
spillover effects on other Member States or adverse effects on the internal 
market and the common EU interest.379 
Neither TFEU Articles 107 and 108 nor EU law in general set forth 
uniform rules that can be applied to ensure the correct separation of 
economic and non-economic activities for State aid purposes. Instead, this 
responsibility rests with the Member States, supported by the European 
Commission.380 
In principle, all public funding to universities is State aid. As a result, 
universities in the EU must comply with the State aid rules when they 
collaborate for economic gain with industry.381 That is why, historically, 
many universities clearly separated their economic and non-economic 
activities. Fortunately, recent changes in EU policy have made it easier to 
commercialize government-funded research without violating the State aid 
restrictions.382 
State aid that contributes to well-defined objectives of common 
European interest without unduly distorting competition or affecting trade 
between Member States may be compatible with the common market under 
 
 378.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 107(1), 
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 91 [hereinafter Treaty on the Functioning of the EU]. 
 379.  Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Devel., Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affairs Competition 
Comm., Global Forum on Competition, Competition, State Aid and Subsidies: Contribution from the 
European Union, 2, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2010)3 (Jan. 11, 2010). 
 380.  The EU Commission can declare the university’s contribution to be compatible with the 
internal market. In such cases, the agreement must be notified to the Commission prior to 
commencement. 
 381.  See Bernhard von Wendland, State Aid and Public Funding for Universities and Other 
Research Organisations, COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL., no. 2, 2010, at 54, 54–55. 
 382.  European Commission Press Release IP/14/586, State Aid: Commission Adopts New Rules 
Facilitating Public Support for Research, Development and Innovation (May 21, 2014), 
http://europa.eu/ rapid/press-release_IP-14-586_en.htm. The new rules, effective on July 1, 2014, are 
designed to ensure that public funds are used as needed and that “state aid mobilises private investments 
in projects that would otherwise not be implemented, while preserving competition in the Single 
Market,” and to “facilitate the transition of knowledge and ideas to the market.” Id. at 1. 
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TFEU Article 107(3). For example, the EU adopted orphan drug legislation 
in 2000383 that was patterned on the U.S. Orphan Drug Act (“ODA”) 
enacted in 1983.384 According to Article 1 of Regulation (EC) 141/2000 on 
Orphan Medicinal Products, the purpose of the regulation is laying down 
an EU procedure for designating  certain medicinal products as “orphan 
products” and increasing incentives to research, develop, and market them. 
The ODA provides incentives for private firms to develop (1) drugs 
for diseases affecting fewer than 200,000 persons in the United States and 
(2) drugs for diseases affecting a larger population in the United States for 
which “there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and 
making available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition 
will be recovered from sales in the United States of such drug.”385 The 
ODA provides a seven-year period of marketing exclusivity for the drug, 
even if it would not otherwise be eligible for patenting,386 federal funding 
through the Food and Drug Administration,387 and a 50% tax credit for 
qualified expenses for human clinical trials.388 
The EC orphan drug legislation is similar. In the EU, orphan 
medicinal products are defined as those intended for the “diagnosis, 
prevention or treatment of a life-threatening or chronically debilitating” 
condition that affects no more than 5 in 10,000 people in the European 
Union.389 The European Commission has authorized 106 orphan medicines 
and designated 1,058 products as orphan medical products.390 The sponsors 
responsible for these medicines benefit from incentives including fee 
waivers for the regulatory procedures or ten-year market exclusivity.391 The 
period of exclusivity “may be curtailed by four years if a product is 
 
 383.  Regulation 141/2000, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on 
Orphan Medicinal Products, 2000 O.J. (L 18) 1. 
 384.  Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15, 21, 26, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). An orphan drug is used to treat a rare disease or 
condition. 21 U.S.C. § 360aa(a) (2012). 
 385.  21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012). 
 386.  21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2012). 
 387.  21 U.S.C. § 360ee (2012). 
 388.  26 U.S.C. § 45C(a) (2012). 
 389.  SCI. SECRETARIAT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION COM. OF EXPERTS ON RARE DISEASES 
(EUCERD) JOINT ACTION, 2014 REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE ART OF RARE DISEASE ACTIVITIES IN 
EUROPE - PART I: OVERVIEW OF RARE DISEASE ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE 9 (2014) [hereinafter RARE 
DISEASE ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE]. 
 390.  John F. Ryan, Turning the Challenge of Rare Diseases into an Opportunity for Europe, 
PARLIAMENT MAG. (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/opinion/turning-
challenge-rare-diseases-opportunity-europe. 
 391.  RARE DISEASE ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE, supra note 389, at 9. 
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‘sufficiently profitable.’”392 In 2003, the British Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics recommended that regulators “use existing orphan medicine 
legislation, or any other policy instrument with equivalent effect, to provide 
incentives for development” of pharmacogenetics products.393 We agree 
with this recommendation and, as argued below, consider it consistent with 
the EU State aid rules. 
TFEU Article 179(1) identifies research and development and 
innovation (“R&D&I”) as an important EU objective: 
 
The Union shall have the objective of strengthening its scientific and 
technological bases by achieving a European research area in which 
researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate freely, and 
encouraging it to become more competitive, including in its industry, 
while promoting all the research activities deemed necessary by virtue of 
other Chapters of the Treaties.394 
 
Article 180 provides: 
 
[t]he Union shall carry out the following activities, complementing the 
activities carried out in the Member States:  
(a) implementation of research, technological development and 
demonstration programmes, by promoting cooperation with and between 
undertakings, research centres and universities;  
(b) promotion of cooperation in the field of Union research, 
technological development and demonstration with third countries and 
international organisations;  
(c) dissemination and optimisation of the results of activities in Union 
research, technological development and demonstration;  
(d) stimulation of the training and mobility of researchers in the 
Union.395 
 
Both the Europe 2020 strategy396 and the “Innovation Union” flagship 
initiative acknowledge that State aid can “actively and positively 
contribute . . . by prompting and supporting initiatives for more innovative, 
 
 392.  Dan Phair, Orphan Drug Programs, Public-Private Partnerships and Current Efforts to 
Develop Treatments for Diseases of Poverty, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 193, 207 (2008). 
 393.  NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, PHARMACOGENETICS: ETHICAL ISSUES, SUMMARY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS xix (2003), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Pharma 
cogenetics-Summary-and-recommendations.pdf. 
 394.  Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, supra note 378, art. 179(1), 2010 O.J. (C 83) at 128. 
 395.  Id. art. 180, 2010 O.J. (C 83) at 129. 
 396.  Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Europe 2020]. 
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efficient and greener technologies, while facilitating access to public 
support for investment, risk capital and funding for research and 
development.”397 Collaboration between universities and the 
pharmaceutical industry through PPPPs can stimulate innovation, spur 
growth, and enhance value by decreasing the general innovation gap in the 
pharmaceutical industry and increasing the competitiveness of EU 
commercial firms. But the contract must pass muster under the State aid 
balancing test, where “the Commission balances the negative effects on 
trade and competition in the common market with its positive effects in 
terms of contributing to the achievement of well-defined objectives of 
common interest.”398 The balancing test examines the following elements: 
 
(1) Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common 
interest (e.g., growth, employment, cohesion, environment)? 
(2) Is the aid well designed to deliver the objective of common interest, 
i.e., does the proposed aid address the market failure or other objective? 
(i) Is State aid an appropriate policy instrument? 
(ii) Is there an incentive effect, i.e., does the aid change the behaviors of 
firms? 
(iii) Is the aid measure proportional, i.e., could the same change in 
behavior be obtained with less aid? 
(3) Are the distortions of competition and effect on trade limited, so that 
the overall balance is positive?399 
 
In 2012, the European Commission launched  
 
State Aid Modernisation (SAM), an ambitious reform package of State 
Aid policy with three key objectives: to foster growth in a strengthened, 
dynamic and competitive internal market, in line with the objectives of 
the Europe 2020 growth strategy; to focus enforcement on cases with the 
 
 397.  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU State Aid Modernisation 
(SAM), ¶ 10, COM (2012) 209 final (Aug. 5, 2012) (citing Europe 2020, supra note 396, at 20). Before 
granting State aid, Member States must either (1) obtain the authorisation from the Commission 
(notification) or (2) ensure that the State aid is exempted by a general Commission Block Exemption 
Regulation, which considers the most obvious market failures and allows Member States to take State 
aid measures that could lead to limited market distortions. Hence, the Commission can focus on large 
State aid cases with high risk of competition and trade distortions. State Aid in General, EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, 1–2, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/stateaid/gl-chapters-1-and-2_en.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 
2014). 
 398.  See Bente Tranholm-Schwarz et al., The Real Economy—Challenges for Competition Policy 
in Periods of Retrenchment, COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL., no. 1, 2009, at 3, 3–4. 
 399.  Commission Notice, Community Framework for State Aid for Research and Development 
and Innovation, § 1.3.1., 2006 O. J. (C 323) 1, 5. 
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biggest impact on internal market; [and] to streamline rules and ensure 
 faster decisions.400 
 
The revised Enabling Regulation, adopted by the Council in 2013, 
introduced new categories of aid that the Commission may decide to 
exempt from the obligation of prior notification, including innovation aid. 
The European Commission has identified the following R&D&I measures 
for which State aid may, under specific conditions, be compatible with the 
internal market: 
 
(a) aid for R&D projects where the aided part of the research project falls 
within the categories of fundamental research and applied research, of 
which the latter can be divided into industrial research and experimental 
development. . . .;401 
(b) aid for feasibility studies related to R&D projects, which aims at 
overcoming a market failure primarily related to imperfect and 
asymmetric information;402 
(c) aid for the construction and upgrade of research infrastructures, 
which mainly addresses the market failure stemming from coordination 
difficulties. . . .;403 
(d) aid for innovation activities, which is mainly targeted at market 
failures related to positive externalities (knowledge spill-overs), 
coordination difficulties and, to a lesser extent, asymmetric 
information. . . .;404 
(e) aid for innovation clusters . . . .405 
 
 
 400. EC Taking Stock 2014, supra note 8, at 38. 
 401.  Commission Communication, Framework for State Aid for Research and Development and 
Innovation, ¶ 12(a), 2014 O.J. (C 198) 1, 4 [hereinafter Commission Framework for State Aid] 
(emphasis omitted). “Such aid is mainly targeted at the market failure related to positive externalities 
(knowledge spill-overs), but may also address a market failure caused by imperfect and asymmetric 
information or (mainly in collaboration projects) a coordination failure[.]” Id. 
 402.  Id. ¶ 12(b) (emphasis omitted). 
 403.  Id. ¶ 12(c) (emphasis omitted). “High-quality research infrastructures are increasingly 
necessary for ground-breaking research, as they attract global talent and are essential for example for 
information and communication technologies and key enabling technologies[.]” Id. For definitions of 
key enabling technologies, see Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European 
Strategy for Key Enabling Technologies – A Bridge to Growth and Jobs, COM (2012) 341 final (June 
26, 2012). 
 404.  Commission Framework for State Aid, supra note 401, ¶ 12(d) (emphasis omitted). 
 405.  Id. ¶ 12(e) (emphasis omitted). Coordination problems can hamper the development of 
clusters, or limit the interactions and knowledge flows within and between clusters. State aid could help 
address this market failure, first by supporting the investment in open and shared infrastructures for 
innovation clusters and, second, by supporting, for no longer than ten years, the operation of clusters for 
the enhancement of collaboration, networking, and learning. Id. 
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If, however, a PPPP agreement is not on market terms—e.g., if the 
university does not demand the market price for its share of intellectual 
property rights transferred to the for-profit firm as a result of the 
collaboration—then the university’s entire contribution to the project might 
be considered State aid.406 
Thus, an exemption to the State aid restrictions is available, pursuant 
to TFEU Articles 107(3)(b) and 107(3)(c),407 for pharmaceutical R&D 
performed by a partnership between a university and a private enterprise as 
long as the arrangement, including the royalties and licensing fees payable, 
is on market terms. Hence, both to reduce transaction costs408 and to 
provide more certainty with respect to the EU competition laws and the 
State aid regulation, we propose that regulators in the EU create a safe 
harbor for PPPPs using pre-approved standardized licensing contracts, such 
as the Uniform Biological Materials Transfer Agreement.409 Universities 
are often willing to acquire materials in accordance with such agreements, 
but they demand more favorable terms when asked to transfer their own 
materials, creating a collective action problem.410 By offering a safe harbor 
for parties willing to accept such an agreement, regulators in the EU could 
help facilitate the transfer of materials as well as technologies. As a logical 
first step, we recommend that the European Commission add a State aid 
 
 406.  Id. ¶ 28(d) (stating that the Commission considers that “no indirect State aid is awarded to the 
participating undertakings” if “the research organisations [defined to include universities] . . . receive 
compensation equivalent to the market price for the [intellectual property rights] which result from their 
activities and are assigned to the participating undertakings”). 
 407.  See also Communication From the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Investing in Research: 
An Action Plan for Europe, COM (2003) 226 final/2 (June 4, 2003); Europe 2020, supra note 396; Case 
173/73, Italy v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 709; Case C-487/06 P, British Aggregates Ass’n v. Comm’n, 
2008 E.C.R. I-10515. 
 408.  See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 
58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1409 (2009) (“The economic analysis of boilerplate discusses the benefits of 
contract standardization for contract drafters. It argues quite effectively that network effects cause 
contract drafters to reuse contract language (in the form of boilerplate) to save themselves drafting 
costs, economize on learning costs, reuse ‘safe’ language that has been vetted by courts, and signal to 
prospective counterparties that the contract drafter does not seek an unfair advantage through the 
drafting process.”). See also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in 
Corporate Contracting (or the “Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719-20 (1997) 
(defining “learning benefits” as “(a) drafting efficiency; (b) reduced uncertainty over the meaning and 
validity of a term due to prior judicial rulings; and (c) familiarity of a term among lawyers, other 
professionals, and the investment community”). 
 409.  Further information about this agreement can be accessed at Uniform Biological Materials 
Transfer Agreement, ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, http://www.autm.net/resources-surveys/ 
material-transfer-agreements/uniform-biological-material-transfer-agreement/ (last visited Dec. 5, 
2014). 
 410.  Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 375, at 305–06. 
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safe harbor to the European IMI regime, provide guidance on the 
contractual provisions that would come within it, and require bidders for 
IMI funds to include their proposed contract with their bid. 
Because one size rarely fits all,411 the standardized contracts “blessed” 
by the EU regulators could provide alternative licensing terms from which 
the parties to a PPPP could select. Like Beirne Roose-Snyder and Megan 
Doyle, who proposed “a comprehensive approach to humanitarian licensing 
for universities—a Global Health Licensing Program,” which includes “a 
toolbox of access licensing options for technology transfer offices to use 
during licensing negotiations,”412 we encourage the European Commission 
to offer various alternative arrangements. One might be a nonexclusive 
license of the sort offered by Stanford and the University of California 
when it licensed the Cohen-Boyer recombinant DNA patents.413 Patent 
pools open to all that allow non-participants to obtain nonexclusive licenses 
at a commercially reasonable rate, perhaps as determined by a trusted 
intermediary, are another option. At the same time, certain practices, such 
as mandatory reach-back licenses and prohibitions on the publication of 
adverse test results by academics receiving private funding,414 should be 
prohibited. Universities and private firms would still be permitted to 
negotiate customized contracts that do not violate these prohibitions, but 
they would not have the benefit of ex ante governmental approval. 
CONCLUSION 
PPPPs and other forms of public-private technology transfer are 
powerful tools for bringing life-saving therapies to patients. While not yet 
widely employed in the European pharmaceutical industry, such 
arrangements can both enhance competitiveness and improve societal and 
individual patient welfare. As a result, we argue that policymakers in the 
EU should encourage utilization of such arrangements and facilitate their 
formation and operation by clarifying the applicability of the State aid 
limitations. 
A comparative analysis of the EU and U.S. approaches to translational 
medicine shows that there are lessons to be shared. PPPPs and other forms 
 
 411.  Beirne Roose-Snyder & Megan K. Doyle, The Global Health Licensing Program: A New 
Model for Humanitarian Licensing at the University Level, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 281, 284 (2009) (“No 
single approach will meet the needs of every negotiating partner or every type of licensed intellectual 
property, and there is no silver bullet to bridge the access gap.”). 
 412.  Id. at 284. 
 413.  Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 375, at 300. 
 414.  See, e.g., Downie & Herder, supra note 109, at 34 (offering examples of instances when 
private firms threatened legal action if an academic published negative results or commentary). 
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of collaborative research and university technology licensing can 
significantly enhance research, development, and commercialization in the 
pharmaceutical sector and other similar industries. The EU can apply the 
experiences from Bayh-Dole and technology transfer in the United States, 
and the United States can emulate the open innovation aspects of the 
European IMI concept, the open access objectives embodied in Horizon 
2020, and the tighter patenting standards imposed by the European Patent 
Office. In particular, the EU could encourage the Member States to permit 
universities to obtain patents on government-funded inventions, perhaps 
with a royalty-sharing arrangement akin to Denmark’s. At the same time, 
the U.S. Congress should consider removing obstacles to cooperative 
research and commercialization by amending the Bayh-Dole Act to 
promote more open innovation for certain upstream research and research 
tools. 
There is another option available to lawmakers in both the EU and the 
United States, in addition to “concrete legislation.” Because the PPPP 
contract is the law of the parties, regulators could promote more efficient 
allocations of intellectual property rights by developing model contracts for 
the allocation of IP rights generated by publicly sponsored research. For 
example, Congress could require the inclusion of a specific clause in a 
PPPP contract relating to research funded by the National Institutes of 
Health in the United States. Similarly, the European Commission could, as 
a start, require a specific clause in an IMI contract and transition to offering 
standard contract terms for other types of PPPPs. The European 
Commission can also outline a safe harbor procedure to ensure that 
university inventions are licensed on market terms. Both the United States 
and the EU could at least offer templates from which grant applicants could 
choose. A funding agency could then take those contractual terms into 
account when reviewing grant applications. For basic research that depends 
primarily on university scientists for success, the preferred allocation might 
be to the scientists. For more applied research, it might be best to rely on 
university technology transfer offices to negotiate directly with the industry 
partner. 
 
